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INTRODUCTION1
In an underdeveloped country, the operations of the
State shape the short-run performance and the development path
of the economy, This significant role of the State arises from the
characteristics of underdevelopment ltsetf.
Domestic markets of an underdeveloped country are small and
undeveloped. If they are not served by foreign producers, they are
served by one or two local producers. Under such a situation, the
State must determine how many will serve the market and who will
be given the privilege to do so.
The average income levels in an underdeveloped country are
low, and private savings are incapable of financing the development
requirements. Thus, the State mobilizes the financial resources by
taxing the few who can save, drawing on foreign savings, and taxing
the many a little, then directs these resources to a few private
investors.2 Or it resorts to some forcible measures, such as inflicting
inflation through its power to print currency.
The "Democratic" and the Corporate Approaches
Since 1946, these issues have confronted the Ptlilippine fiscal
system, the responses to w_htch have been conditioned by the
nature of the fiscal decision process and the interest of the groups
1. The first complete version of this paper, which extensively discussed
the martial law experience in the Philippines, was completed on 3 February
1986, four days before the presidential elections that led to the overthrow
of the Marcos regime.
2. As would be the case with industrial protection through tariffs arid
quotas.
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that have participated in the said process. In the Philippines, two
different processes have been attempted: an American-style "demo-
cratic" fiscal decision process before 1972, and a corporate ap-
proach from 1972 onward. In the "democratic" process, the decision
was a result of the accommodation of competing interests which, as
will be explained later, tended to prevent the system from address-
ing urgent development matters.
In the corporate approach, there had been an attempt to direct
the fiscal system independently in promoting a development pro-
gram. This required the elimination of the legal underpinnings of
the previous system. However, this approach could only be sus-
tained ff the previously powerful groups could be neutralized. As
will be explained later, the neutralization effort created inefficien-
cies and restrained the boldness of the reform program.
The declaration of martial law in 1972 led to a fundamental re-
structuring of the country's political system which bad profound
consequences on the fiscal system,
President Marcos justified the suspension of democratic insti-
tutions by citing the need to combat rightist and leftist threat to the
state. This threat, in turn, was treated as arising from lack of
development, and that the inadequacy of development itself could
be traced to these obstructionist and unresponsive institutions.
Thus, President Marcos used his auth Jrltarlan powers to reform
society. A large number of fiscal reforms had been put in place so
rapidly that by 1976 Kintanar (1976) could already declare: "One
area where significant reforms have been achieved under the New
Society is the area of fiscal reforms."
Even when martial law was liked in January 1981, the changes
that have been effected continued to have impact on the system. For
this reason, we refer to the period before 1972 as the pre-marttal law
period, and that after as the post-martial law period.
This paper wlll evaluate the reforms instituted during martial
law and explain why or how these reforms failed. Thus, the case
study will deal with the effects on the fiscal system of the authori-
tarian form of government. It must be noted, however, that the
authoritarian experiment had peculiarities, and one was the un-
precedented availability o¢ foreign financing during the experiment
period.
ANote on Methodology
The methodology used in this study consisted of the following:
(i) an analysis of the data on public finance in the post-martial law
period, (2) a study of the perceptions of key decision makers through
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FISCALPOLICYINTHECONTEXT
OFTHEPHILIPPINEECONOMY
Ts section serves as a brief introduction to the
structure of the Philippine economy and to its fiscal system.
Structure of the Philippine Economy
The Philippines, an archipelago of three major island groups,
has a population of 54 million, growing at a rate of 2.7 percent per
year. 3 Its 1984 per capita GNP was estimated at $660 (1986 World
Bank Development Report), down from $760 in 1983, when the
economic crisis brought about by the assassination of former
Senator Benlgno Aquino began (see Tables 1 and 2).
Of its gross domestic product (GDP), 26 percent is contributed
by agriculture, fishery, and forestry; 36 percent by the industrial
sector; and about the same percentage by the service sector. The
economy can be considered pre-industrial, where agriculture still
employs over 55 percent of the labor force, 70 percent of the popu-
lation lives in rural areas, and the service sector is dominated by low
skill employment.
About 64 percent of GNP is accounted for by personal consump-
tion expenditures, 29 percent by investment expenditures (gross
domestic capital formation), 5 percent by government's fixed capital
formation, and 9 percent by general government e,xloenditures.
The value of exports of goods and services comprises about 19
percent of GNP, while imports account for 21 percent, so that total
trade constitutes about 40 percent of GNP. In the recent period,
between 20 and 30 percent of the country's total trade has been with
3. The population growth rate was as high as 3.1 percent per year in
the 1960s.
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Table 1
Basic Statistics on the Philippines
1, Population (1985) 54,378 million
a. Percent ot population in Urban Areas(1980) 37.3
2. Percent of output from
a. Agriculture (1984) 26,8
b. Industry (1984) 34.4
3. Annual growth rates per decade (percent)
Real GNP Real GNP Agriculture Industry
per capita
1950-1960 3.2 6,3 5.0 6.9
1960-1970 2.1 5.2 4.7 9.0
1970-1980 3.5 6.4 4.9 8,3
1980-1987 -2.4 0.2 1.4 -1,0
4, Per Capita GNP (1984) P10,004
US$99
5. Exports as a percentage of GNP
1950-1960 19.56%
1960-1970 19,33%
1970-1980 17.27%
6, Total child mortality rate (1983) 72.08%
7. Gini Coefficient (1984) 0.5564
8. Inflation and variation in exchange rate
Rates Exchange Rate (P/S)
CPI Inflation Nominal Real
1950-1960 0.0 0.0 1.1
1960-1970 5.3 12.3 7.8
1970-1980 14.9 1,6 -4.9
1980-1984 26.8 22.1 1.7
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Table 2
Selected Data on Public Finance
1960 1970 1980 1984
Tax revenue/GNP (%) 8.2 9.6 12.1 9.5
Gov't.expenditure/GNP (%) 8.6 8.7 9.7 12.3
Gov't investment/GNP (%) 1.6 1.0 6.2 2.4
(Construction only)
Social Security contribution/GNP (1984) 0.1%
1978 1982 1983 1984
Government deficit/GNP (%) 1.2 4.7 2.0 2.2
Public corporations 1972 1984
Capital investments (P billion) 3.1 11.9
Internal cash generation (P billion) 0,1 0.8
Proportion of budget deficit financed from foreign sources (%)
1978-1982 64.8
1983-1984 88.3
Sources: Neda Statistical Yearbook, 1985.
Philippine Development Report, 1984.
the United States, and between 20 and 25 percent withdapan. With
each country, the Philippines has been running a trade deficit of
some $300 million. The country's 10 principal exports are domi-
nated by agricultural and primary products--copra, sugar, ba-
nanas, logs and lumber, desiccated coconut, coconut oil, and
canned pineapples.
Phases in Economic Growth
Since Independence from the US in 1946, the Philippines can be
said to have tried four different policy regimes: the colonial regime
from 1946 to 1949, the import-substitution regime from 1950 to
1962, an attempted export-oriented period from 1962 to 1970, and
the debt-driven growth regime from 1970 to 1983.
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The Colonial Period, 1946-1949
The grant of political independence in 1946 did not change the
colonial character of the country's economic ties with the US. The
Philippines shared currency with the US and continued to depend
heavily on it for the importation of finished products, paying for
these imports with the exports of agricultural products (copra,
coconut oil, abaca, and sugar). The country financed its trade
deficits during that period with the war damage funds and with aids
from the US. These funds were exhausted in 1949, precipitating a
balance-of-payments crisis that forced the country to address the
issue of independent economic management.
The Import_Sub.stitUtion Period, 1950-1962
With US advice, the Philippines established its own Central
Bank and embarked on an import-substitution industrialization
strategy, which had strong support from development theorists at
that time. This strategy was pursued through an economic regime
in which the currency was pegged at two pesos to a US dollar and
was sustained by import controls on foreign exchange.
Most of the present industrial infrastructure of the country have
their beginnings in this period. Investments in automobile and
consumer-products assembly, tire . manufacturing, and glass-prod-
ucts], manufacturing were undertaken. US firms which _.used
to set-ce the Philippine market carried out Significant domestic
investments. A treaty between the US and the Philippines extended
equal business and opportunity rights to US nationals.
By its nature, the in]port control system imposed a high implicit
price on finished products and subsidized intermediate inputs. This
structure was maintained even when tariffs gradually began to
replace controls in 1959. This generated a whole set of final-stage
processing enterprises with very little domestic integration. It also
guaranteed that the income coefficient of imports would be slgnffi-
candy larger than one, while exports, which continued to be agricul-
tural, grew only at 4.8 percent per year, This meant that financing
the importation of the needed intermediate inputs for industry
became increasingly difficult.
The balance-of-payments crisis of 1962 forced the partial dis-
mantling of the foreign exchange controls and a 50 percent devalu-
ation of the peso.
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Attempted Export-Oriented Period, 1962 - 1970
Under influence of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the
Philippines tried to pursue an export-oriented strategy in response
to the 1962 crisis without actually abandoning the import-substi-
tution system. The devaluation in 1962 and the removal of ex-
change controls helped to diversify export products. There was
greater success in the export of raw-material products, such as
copper and logs. Therewere also significant investments in these
industries. Generally, however, the inflow of foreign investments
similar to that experienced during the import-substitution period
was never attained. Thus, in 1967, a comprehensive investment
incentives program, patterned "after those of Taiwan and South
Korea, was developed in response to the slow rate of investment.
Near.the end of this period, the country barely managed to avoid
a large balance-of-payments crisis. Export, which grew by 9.5
percent per year between 1962 and 1967, fell by 11 percent in 1967
and did not recover its 1967 level until 1972. Tills meant that for the
whole 1962-1970 period, annual export growth was only similar to
that achieved in the import-substitution period,
Heavy government spending during the election campaign of
1969, when Marcos became the first president to be reelected,
precipitated a balance-of-payments crisis in 1970. Thus, the Phil-
ippines was forced to deal with the IMF for the second time.
Debt-Driven Growth Period, 1970-I 983
The 1970 economic program inaugurated a long-term relation-
ship between the Philippines and the IMF, in which the country was
constantly on a standby program, except for about a year between
1 January 1982 and 25 February 1983. Exports grew by 6.3 percent
between 1970 and 1972. The world commodity boom of 1973 pro-
duced a 15 percent export growth and a rare current_account
surplus that year. The Philippines met the agreed upon targets in a
program correctly designed to solve a crisis brought about by
government overspending.
The strategy from 1970 onward seemed to have been that of
trying to solve simultaneously the balance-of-payments and the
investment rate shortfalls by increasing the utilization of foreign
savings. The continuous relationship with the IMF and the World
Bank were in support of this strategy, which required structural
changes that would reduce import dependence, increase export
earnings, and improve labor absorption.
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Thq inflow of funds and the rise in investment rate allowed the
average annual GNP growth rate to recover to 6.4 percent between
1970 and 1983. The industrial sector grew at 6.9 percent and the
agricultural sector at 4.1 percent. Policies that encouraged non-
traditional exports were tried, resulting in more diversification. Ex-
ports recovered to a 6.0 percent growth rate during the period. 4
The onset of the international debt crisis in 1982 rendered
unsustainable the debt-driven growth strategy. Between 1980 and
1983, when the country relied heavily on short-term borrowing to
maintain the strategy, growth slowed down to 2.2 percent per year.
The political crisis of 1983 triggered by the assassination of Sena-
tor Benlgno Aquino shut off short-term credits and precipitated a
severe balance-of-payments crisis. Thus ended the debt-driven
growth policy regime.
The Philippine Fiscal System
All in all, government expenditures "directly" account for about
14 percent of GNP. "Indirect" government participation in the
economy, in the form of government-controlled corporations and
quasi-government operations such as the coconut and sugar mo-
nopolies, started after the martial law declaration in 1972 and grew
rapidly since 1981. 5
The size of government expenditures relative to GNP became
noticeably larger since the Marcos administration took over in
1965. As shown in Table 3, government expenditure was 9 percent
of GNP before 1965. Budget deficits, which are indirect measure of
the extent to which government utilizes credit that might have been
needed by the private sector, also grew steadily, from 1.9 percent of
GNP in 1970 to 4.6 percent in 1981 and 4.7 percent in 1982 (Table
4).
Distribution of the national government budget is depicted in
Tables 5 and 6. Table 5 provides a percentage breakdown between
current operating expenditures and capital expenditures. A clear
shift in expenditures toward capital outlays since 1985 can be seen.
Capital expenditures, which comprised only about 15 percent of
total government budget in 1965, increased to almost 40 percent in
1982.
4. The long-term gain in _ports has been problematic since the non-
traditional exports, notably garments and silicon chips, have high import
contents.
5. Government guarantees on loans by private and government busi-
nesses through government banks (Philippine National Bank, Land Bank,
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Table 3
Total Government Expenditure and Gross National Product
(In million pesos)
Total GNP
Year Government (Nominal Expenditure/GNP
Expenditure Prices)
1960 1,196 13,833 8.6
1965 2,035 23,382 8.7
1970 4,054 41,751 9.7
1975 19,049 114,265 16.7
1980 36,935 265,008 13.9
1984 66,352 379,345 17.5
Sources:Manasan(1982)
1983NEDAStatisticalYearbook
Table 4
Budget and Current Account Deficits
(In million pesos)
Budget % of Budget Current Account
Year Surplus Deficit to GNP Balance
1975 -1,403 -1.2 -6,071
1976 -2,349 -1.8 -7,920
1977 -2,852 -1.8 -4,872
1978 -2,167 -1.2 -8,385
1979 -342 -0.2 -9,763
1980 -3,387 -1.3 -13,536
1981 -12,146 -4.6 -15,338
1982 -14,405 -4.7 -25,339
1983 -6,422 -1.9 -26,394
1984 -8,714 -2.3 -14,756
Sources:Amatong,et al. (1985),pp. 17-18.
NEDAStatisticalYearbook1985,
Development Bank of the Philippines) have also grown substantially
during the debt-driven growth period.
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Table 5
Percentage Distribution of the Government Budget
by Economic Classification
'i 196197_0197t9801982198
1. Capital Outlay 14,6 19.2 38,7 34.'[ 38.2 27.6 I_
2, Current Expenditures 85.4 80.8 61.3 65.9 61.8 63,5 _t
a. Personal services 55.8 46.8 23.5 26:2 24.6 25.4 _
b. Maintenance and other expenses 24,7 28.1 32.8 2818 28.5 29.2 Ii/I
,I c, Debt service 5.0 6.0 5.0 10,8 8,7 20.0 II_
l-Not completely comparable to previous years due to government reclassification.
Sources: 1983 NEDA Statistical Yearbook.
1985 NEDA Statistical Yearbook.
Table 6
Percentage Distribution of the Government Budget
by Sectoral Classification
1965 1970 1976 19801 19821 1984_ 1985_
1. Economic Servicess 16,7 31.7 45.5 42.3 42.4 26.8 29.9
2, SocialServices 44,2 34.9 18.9 20,2 23.3 26.8 23.9
a. Education 36.5 28,0 11,6 11.8 12.4 16.4 14.8
b, Health, housing and population 6,2 5.6 4.1 6,6 9.0 6.9 6,0
c. Others 1.5 1.3 3.2 1.8 1.9 3,5 3,0
3, National Defense 16.7 15.2 20,9 12.0 11.2 9.2 8.6
4. General Services 27.3 18.3 14.6 25.4 23.0 37.2 37.6
(_ncludingdebt service)
_Not completely comparable to previous years due to changes in government classification.
2Agriculture, ind_.,try, utilities and infrastructure.
3Estimates,
Source: 1983 NEDA Statistical Yearbook,
On the revenue side (see Manasan 1982), the government relies
mainly on both direct and indirect tax collections. There are three
main types of direct taxes collected: personal Income tax, corporate
income tax, and transfer tax.
The code on personal income tax provides for steeply progres-
sive schedule for resident citizens. _ The data base for determining
actual compliance to such progressive tax structure is poor, but
studies indicate that evasion is extensive. 7
6. Starting from a tax of 3 percent on an annual taxable income of
P2,000 (on an exchange rate of P20 to $1), personal Income tax rises
through 37 steps to a maximum rate of 70 percent for annual income of
P500,000 or more.
7. See Manasan (1982): NTRC (1988).
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Corporate income tax rate is 25 percent on the first P100,000
and 35 percent on any amount after that2 Accounting procedures
of the corporate tax system are sophisticated, both from the govern-
ment and the corporate taxpayer's side. But as will be discussed
later, there exists an extensive system of tax exemptions and
incentives.
There are two transfer taxes, the gift tax and the estate tax. Both
are forms of inheritance tax. The gift tax is applicable during the
transferor's lifetime, while the estate tax is applicable after his
death. Gift tax rates start from 1.5 percent for gifts of less than
P50,000 to 40 percent for gifts of over P3 million. The estate tax
ranges from 3 percent for inheritance of less than P60,000 to 60
percent for inheritance of over P3 million.
There are four main types of indirect taxes: sales tax, specific
tax, exp.ort.tax, and import duty.
A sales and specific tax system is applied to a11goods exchanged
in the country, except those exempted by special provision (such as
goods imported by the armed forces). Tax rates vary according to the
essentiality and origin of the commodity. °
The relative importance of these tax sources is shown in Table
7. Since income and wealth constitute the only source of direct
taxation, between 75 and 80 percent of tax revenues are in the form
of indirect taxation. Trade taxes (import tariffs and export taxes)
constitute almost 40 percent of total tax revenues, while excise/
Table 7
Percentage Distribution of Tax Revenu_e__s_.._bvSg.u_l'ce
.........1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1984 9_iii_i
Income/wealth taxes 23.7 25.4 27.1 26.6 24.6 26.0 i_i_i{i
Trade taxes 27 9 26 9 23 4 31.9 36.3 33.5 "iii
Exc se and sa es taxes 46 7 46 5 44 5 31 7 29.2 33.3 iii
Other taxes 1 7 1 2 4 9 9 7 9.8 7.2 _{_i
Tax revenue to GNP 6.6 6.5 6.5 11.0 10.8 9.5 ::i!i!i!
Source: Sicat (1984), p, 340
8. One of the first acts of the Aquino government was to Impose a single
35 percent tax rate.
9. Before the change In government, non-essentials had 50 percent tax
rate, and essential Items, 5 percent. Locally produced goods were subject
to a smaller tax.
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sales taxes have declined in importance. The last line of Table 7
shows that tax revenues as part of GNP practically doubled in the
1970s, essentially due to increases in the collection of trade taxes,
Compared with other countries, the Philippine tax effort is
ranked rather low, at rank numbers 41 (Lotz and Moras 1967), 34
(Shin 1969), and 39 (Bah] 1971). Other studies show deteriorating
tax performance (Caballes 1975).
3
GROUPSTHATDETERMINEDECISIONS
Wwfll now try to identify the important social
groups that determine fiscal decision-making in the Philippines,
This discussion will also deal with the changes that have occurred
since the martial law period.
The structure of the Philippine economy largely determines the
groups that influence fiscal decision-making in the Philippines. For
example, the landlord groups trace their origin to the Spanish land
grants •and the sale of church lands to the local elite during the
American occupation. The small domestic entrepreneurial class
which depends on a protected market emerged during the import-
substitution period of the 1950s.
Landlords
A tenanted mode of producUon continues to dominate the agri-
cultural sector. However, there is no single group of landlords. It is
difficult to identify formal organizations which represent specifi-
cally the landlord interest m public policy. The economic aspect of
landlord interest Is overshadowed by the political aspect, which is
the protection of their local Power and property. This political role
•is performed by the local chapters of the dominant political parties,
in cooperation with local police and military forces.
The participation of landlord groups in fiscal policy questions is
most directly felt in the inability of the state to collect real property
taxes for development purposes. Until •1973, when Presidential De-
cree 464 was passed, the real property tax system was not codified.
As Klntanar (1976) noted, this codfficauon had "been discussed
among proponents and objectors for decades," and it "required a
change in the legislative procedure for such a reform to be promul-
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..................... r .........................
gated because the duly elected representatives of the people were
heavily representing landowners, industrialists, and commercial
interests who could not be expected to tax themselves willingly."
The highly skewed land ownership pattern in the Philippines
represents a hypothetically important tax base, but landlord par-
ticipation in the legislative process effectively prevents any serious
reliance on this tax base.
Filipino Businessmen
Profit-oriented enterprises in the Philippines trace their roots
from the colonial-era merchant economy dominated by foreign and
Chinese traders. Thus, the definition of a "Filipino _ businessman is
always problematic. Yoshi_hara (1985) presents a •valuable account
of the ethnic diversity of Philippine capital and discusses the
difficulties of defining what Filipino capital is,
For our purposes, our main concern is in differentiating the
Filipino businessman from the interests of foreign multinational
enterprises in the country. Thus, almost any person, regardless of
citizenship, would be considered a Filipino businessman as long as
the home base of his capital is the Philippines. lo According to this
view, Filipino capitalists are those whose "bread currency" is that of
the Philippines. Their situation is materially different from that of
foreign entrepreneurs whose capital investment decisions are heav-
ily conditioned by their ability to withdraw capital from the country,
•even permanently, so long as the comparative returns justify it,
Fo r Filipino businessmen, capital has originated from trading
surpluses (especially for many Chinese-Filipinos) and from land
rents.
Filipino businessmen have formal organizations to represent
their interests. The National Economic Protectionism Association
(NEPA) was founded in the 1930s to advocate the interests of
Filipino businesses, as opposed to non-Filipino, mostly American,
interests. This association, which has grassroots organizations up
to the city level, became a powerful lobby group during the import-
substitution period of the 1950s. But it waned in Importance and
influence as the economic policies of that period were dismantled.
In its place, the Philippine Chamber of Commerce and the Philip-
pine Chamber of Industries, which later merged to form the Philip-
• 10- Foreign capitalists raise a significant portion of their capital locally,
so that a definition based on where the capital is raised would be
• meaningless.
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pine Chamber of Commerce and Industries (PCCI), took over.
Membership in this organization is not limited to businessmen: it
includes executives of locally incorporated companies.
Most industrial enterprises in the country originated as import-
substituting operations even before the import-substitution pe-
riod. 11It is not surprising that businessmen consistently pursued
legislation to limit competition from foreign capital and to rapidly
increase the domestic market through tariff walls and import
controls. Notwithstanding their interest in protection from foreign
competition, businessmen have consistently supported currency
overvaluatlon in the post-war period. Because devaluation raises
the costs of imported inputs and squeezes profit margins, the
consistent support of business to overvaluation is probably due to
the fact that protection derived from tariffs and import controls have
made redundant the protection derived from exchange rate policy.
It also £ndieates that the country never transcended the first phase
of import substitution, which concentrated on final processing.
Businessmen from large companies have tended to dominate
business associations and business participation in politics. This
reflects a highly skewed distribution of economic power among
business firms. Ten companies account for almost one-third of the
gross revenues of the top 1,000 corporations. The combined net
income of the top 10 was 1.3 times the total net income of the top
1,000 corporations in 1982 (IBON Databank, 1983).
A consistent interest of big business since the 1950s has been
the raising of their capital from government-generated resources,
which is not unique to the Philippines. This effort has taken many
forms. In the 1950s, Import controls and tariffs practically allowed
protected flirns to "collect taxes" from domestic consumers. In the
1960s, comprehensive investment-incentive legislation provided
tax and tariff exemptions, accelerated depreciation, and other
benefits to priority projects. In the 1970s, development programs,
such as the progressive car manufacturing program, provided
generous capital to large businessmen. Since the 1950s, develop-
ment financing has been available at subsidized rates from the
Central Bank (CB) and the Development Bank of the Philippines
(DBP). In the 1970s, the Philippine National Bank (PNB) also
provided huge amounts of development financing.
Government Bureaucrats
The US occupation left behind a well-defined and, by Asian
11. Yoshihara (1985) is a good reference for this.
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standards,modem government machinery. Since the US had fol-
lowed a policyofrelyingheavilyon the localelitetorun the colonial
administration,the government machinery had been manned tothe
highest levelsby Filipinos.The majority ofgovernment bureau-
crats,then as now, came from the privilegedclasses,m
Beforemartiallaw,government bureaucrats tendedtorepresent
the interestsofthe factionofthe elitefrom which they came. Elite
factionscompeted vigorouslywith each other forgovernment bu-
reaucraticpower because of the tremendous access to wealth it
provided.But during martiallaw,bureaucraticpower was concen-
tratedinthe factionaround the President{seeDe Dios 1984).I_
The post-martiallaw period saw an increase in the number of
governmental departments and in the sizeof the bureaucracy.
"Technocrats" in government bureaucracy rose in importance.
Theirmost common featurewas theirpossession ofsome advanced
academic qualifications.These qualificationsdid not have to be in
any particularfield;they could be science,education,ora master's
degreeinbusiness administration(asin the case ofPrime Minister
Cesar Virata).I'_A degree from the US was an advantage. Many of
Marcos' technocratscame from universit_yfacultyposition,particu-
larlyfrom the Universityofthe Philippines{UP).Table 8 shows the
llstoftechnocratswho have been prominent in the Marcos admini-
stration.
The martial law period opened the possibility for a portion of the
bureaucracy, the technocrats, to act as advocates of policies inde-
pendent of the interests of any particular domestic faction. This
permitted the bureaucracy to participate, in an important but not
always decisive way, in fiscal policy formulation. Under martial law,
the qualification by people's "election" was suspended in favor of
qualification by academic background.
The technocrats, especially those from the universities, were not
answerable to any elite faction, but theywere directly responsible to
the President. They have been Characterized as advocating policies
identified with the IMF-World Bank. is This advocacy went hand in
12. A brief discussion of the dependence of US colonial administration
on the local elite can be found in Corpus (1973).
13. Before martial law, all major appointments had to be approved by
Congress, which also could carry out management audits of budgets and
programs.
14. This did not prevent the technocrats of the Marcos administration
from claiming to be all "economists."
15. See, for example, Bello, et al. (1982), Chapter 7.
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Valencia, 1982; Lindscy, 1976). But the aggregate level of foreign
investments is small, The amount of US investments in the country
is estimated not to exceed $3 billion, which is miniscule compared
to the country's foreign debt outstanding of $26 billion in 1983.
However, foreign firms are located in strategic industries and often
have control of a significant part of their respective markets.
As Yoshihara points out, foreign capital entry into the economy
was often in the interest of import-substitution. This was true
before World War II and during the import-substitution period. An
important element in the entry of foreign capital In the 1950s was
the Laurel-Langley Agreement, which provided "parity rights" to US
nationals. Parity rights gave US nationals treatment and opportu-
nities equal to those enjoyed by Filipino nationals in business op-
erations. Thus, parity rights suspended the nationalist features of
the 1935 Constitution.
In the case of the Philippines, one must distinguish between
foreign capital already in place behind the tariff walls and protec-
tionist measures and foreign capital located outside the country.
Foreign-controlled firms that have located domestically find a
common cause with large Filipino business finns. They have active
chambers of commerce (the American chamber being the oldest and
most influential) and are active members in the Filipino chambers
of commerce.
The interest of large Filipino businessmen in subsidized ex-
change rates, import controls, tariff protection, and tax exemptions
are shared by domestically located foreign firms. The Investment In-
centives Act (IIA) of 1967 allowed foreign firms to invest in "priority
industries." To some extent, the IIA extended parity rights, which
until then had been enjoyed only by US nationals, to all foreign
nationals. The llst of'priority proJects" eventually became a laundry
list that reflected more the in[erest of vested parties than of an
economic development program, When a serious proposal for finan-
cial liberalization was put forward in 1974, foreign firms, which
raise a significant part of their capital from domestic sources,
supported the resistance to such liberalization. 1_
Foreign capital not directly situated in the Philippines tended to
be supportive of this liberalization. In the post-martial law period,
this type of foreign capital became an important participant in the
17. To illustrate the importance of local capital market to foreign
capital, we cite the finding of Warr (1984) which estimates that 90 percent
of the capital invested in the country's first Export Processing Zone in
Bataan was raised by foreign firms from the domestic capital market.
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their voting population, theoretically have a role to play in the
operation of the fiscal system. That they do not is a reflection of their
limited political and economic power even under an electoral
system.
The largest of these groups in the "other" category is that of
peasants and small landowners. Peasant organizations have long
interest in rent reduction and land reform and had occasion to
express this interest in violent forms. Another important "other"
group is that of workers, less than 10 percent of whom are union-
ized. Groupings of labor unions have been formed during and after
martial law. One_of-them is the Trade Union Congress of the Philip-
pines (TUCP) which, on several occasions, has participated in
tripartite meetings with employers' associations and government
representatives for minimum wage bargaintngs.
A third important group is that of small businessmen and
would-be entrepreneurs. The protectionist economic system has
tended to favor large business against small enterprises. Since the
1950s, large businesses have beenpractically guaranteed a margin
because of the tariff differential between finished products and
industrial inputs. Small businessmen have not successfully organ-
ized themselves to advocate their interests.
4
THEDECISIONPROCESS
Tis section compares the fiscal decision process
between the pre-martial law and the post-martial law periods.
The Pre-Martial Law Period
The 1935 Philippine Constitution, framed during the American
occupation, determined the fiscal decision process before martial
law. 2o
The Philippine Constitution took full effect after the country's
independelme from the US in 1946. It was patterned after the US
Constitution and provided for three distinct branches of govern-
ment--the legislative (vested in a bicameral Congress), the judicial
(vested in a Supreme Court), and the executive (headed by the
President). To the legislature was vested the ultimate power of
taxation and govelxlment expenditure. The Initiative for the budget
process was assigned to the executive branch. 21
Budget preparation was assigned to the Budget Commission, an
executive body created under Republic Act 992. Each agency and
bureau had its own budgeting staff. All budgets are consolidated
and reconciled at the department level before submission to the
Budget Commission. 2_
20. The first modem definition of the Philippine fiscal process occurred
during this period. In 1938, the Philippine Commonwealth Act defined the
"budget" as the £mancial program of the national government which
embodies the revenue and expenditure estimates for a given fiscal year.
21. The subsequent discussion on the official pre-marttal law decision
process draws much from Klntanar (1965).
22. Before martial law, the largest executive bodies were called "depart-
ments'; the post-martial law system referred to these bodies as'ministries."
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The President was required to submit to Congress not later than
two weeks after the opening of the regular Congressional sessions
the proposed budget for the coming fiscal year. Congress followed
an American-style budget process that moved from committee level
(with public hearing, ff needed) to the chamber, and finally to a
house-senate conference committee. The budget was subjected to
line-by-line scrutiny.
The timing of actual disbursements in the implementation
stage, carried out in the executive branch, was controlled through
the Budget Commission. 23
The General Auditing Office (GAO) conducts the last stage of the
process, the review of actual expenditures. Auditing service was,
and continues to be, involved even in the disbursing phase since all
fund releases required the approval of the office. 24In addition, the
auditing office has the duty to monitor the completion of projects
and to make an armual report on the total appropriation experience
of each agency.
The political context in which the official budget took place
made it extremely unresponsive to development requirements. As
pointed out by Klntanar, the fiscal process was such that the
"calculus between benefits and costs at the margin precisely stated
in economic theory" was all but lost in the decision-making process.
In the first place, Congressmen concentrated their interest on
particular items in the budget and lost sight of the total or the trade
offs between items. 2s In the second place, the absolute power of
Congress over the appropriation of funds superseded all the staff
work that had taken place before the budget was submitted to
Congress. This means appropriations for projects could be in-
creased unnecessarily, or cut to levels that would make them
unviable.
The fiscal process In the pre-martlal law period was conditioned
heavily by the principl e that the ultimate power over public finance
23. Before 1975, the Philippine fiscal year began on 1 July and ended
on 30 June of the following year. Since 1975, the fiscal year corresponded
with the calendar year.
24. The office, whose concurrence ls required for all disbursements,
would have its auditors assigned to each disbursing agency.
25. There was also the pre-martial law system in which the government
budget was presented as two separate bills, a bill providing for the operating
expenditures of the goverilment, including proposals for the creation of new
offices, and another bill, called the public works bill, for costs of construc-
tion of roads, bridges, irrigation systems, and other Infrastructure projects.
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belonged to Congress. This democratic feature had its unfortunate
disadvantage because government bureaucracy did not have a
direct means of sharing information with Congress. This inade-
quacy of information flow between the bureaucracy and Congress
was traceable, in large part, to the Constitutionally mandated
independence of the government branches from each other. Under
this setup, the bureaucracy dealt with Congress only through the
President. Congress was supposed to be a countervailing power to
the executive and thus should maintain an independent position.
Under this system, Congress and the President woLfld have a
common fiscal program ffthe President's party controlled Congress.
This never happened before maltial law. 2s
A potential stabilizing factor, the presence of political parties
with well-defined and differentiated political positions, did not exist
at that time. The elections and the decision processes were domi-
nated by personalities and conflicts between personalities.
The two dominant parties were seen as convenient and tempo-
rary coalitions of essentially Independent politicians. They became
active only for the election contests. They constantly changed their
platform every election and for every locality. They had no standing
committees to study national issues in between election contests.
Research staffs were essentially personal initiatives of individual
politicians. Often, this situation was viewed as "more democratic"
because issues could be commented upon from any angle, not from
any fixed ideological viewpoint.
The instability of parties and the predominance of individuals
arise from the essentially feudal characteristics of political power in
the country. Under the US-style democracy reflected in the 1935
Constitution, social decisions were made on the basis of represen-
tation in government. The representatives were chosen by elections.
During the US occupation, the landed and the trading classes
dominated the government ,tlarough elections because they had the
resources and the education. The US withdrawal in 1.946 saw the
continuation of such class domination of the political process. This
time, however, the process involved more blatant use by these
classes of the material resources available to them. Vote buying,
ballot stuffing, use of private armies, and other illegal practices
became increasing features of election exercises.
26. The political process in the Philippines had a strong tradition of the
"split ticket," where even the President and the Vice President happened to
be elected from different parties.
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The pre-martial law decision process was cumbersome and
slow. The budget was often approved in the last hours of the
congressional session. The line-by-line scrutiny of the budget was
a venue for grandstanding by individual members. The public works
bill was the target of special interest by individual Congressmen
who ensured that construction projects were allocated to their
region.
The political context of pre-martial law fiscal policy made
difficult the raising of tax revenues. Growth in real tax revenue
averaged 10 percent per year in the 1950s and declined to 5 percent
peryear in the 1960s. It became increasingly difficult to fund public
investment programs. Congress also did not give importance to
foreign borrowings to finance beneficial national projects, such as
electric power generation. During this period, none of the financing
for local infrastructure projects was raised from foreign sources.
The Post-Martial Law Period
When martial law was declared in 1972, a Constitutional Con-
vention was going on. It was convened in 1971 in accordance with
the provisions of the 1935 Constitution, Delegates to the conven-
tion were chosen in special elections. Although a well-defined bloc
of delegates was apparently advocating the interests of President
Marcos, he went ahead with imposing martial law. He incarcerated
a number of convention delegates and political opposition, includ-
ing the late Senator Benlgno Aquino. He also closed down Congress,
the venue through which the traditional parties exercised their
influence over fiscal policy.
In the meantime, the Constitutional Convention reconvened,
minus some members who were jailed. The convention completed
its work in 1973, and the new Constitution was ratified that same
year. President Marcos, however, postponed the implementation of
the Constitutional provision calling for the immediate convening of
an interim national assembly. 2r Thus began a period in which the
revenue and expenditure program of the government became the
sole prerogative of the executive branch. Dunng this period, the
President ruled by issuing presidential decrees (PDs), which had the
force of law. Budget and tax measures were promulgated through
these decrees.
On 24 September 1972, two days after the declaration of martial
law, President Marcos issued PD No. 1, called the Integrated Reor-
gan_ation Plan, which carried out a thoroughgoing reorganization
27. See Macapagal (1975).
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of the government service. The reorganization, designed by the
Commission on Reorganization which Marcos convened in 1970,
effectively strengthened the capability of the executive branch to
design and implement governrnent policy independently of Con-
gress.
A notable result of that reorganization was the creation of the
National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), which con-
solidated national statistical generation and economic planning
and which was tasked with designing the long-term development
plans-of the country. Ano.ther was the reconstitution of the old Joint
Legislative-Executive Tax Council into the National Tax Research
Center to provide staff support for the design of taxes.
Before the convening of the interim national assembly in 1978,
budget preparation and tax design were done without a legislature.
NEDA helped provide the necessary inputs to the budget process.
Eventually, the Budget Commission was elevated to tile ministry
level. The coordinating fiaeal function-was enhanced with the
creatton of the Development Budget Coordinating Committee (DBCC),
a subcommittee of NEDA. The DBCC consisted of the budget
minister as chairman, and the finance minister, planning minister
(who was also NEDA chief), and Central Bank governor as members.
Its location in NEDA embodied the intention to remedy the deficient
development orientation of pre-martlal law fiscal policy..
The official process within the executive branch did not change
drastically. The ministries submitted their proposed budgets to the
DBCC, where they were required to justify their plans in formal
hearings. This process allowed greater coordination between devel-
opment programs and the budget since the DBCC had the capability
to look simultaneously at revenue ceilings, expenditure totals, and
borrowing constraints, especially those pertinent to foreign borrow-
ings. The new process effectively allowed the estimated foreign fund
inflow to be consciously factored In for the design of budget and tax
measures of the next fiscal year. These things, as pointed out
earlier, were hardly discussed expeditiously in the Congressional
process (Fernandez 1973).
The rate of Inflow of foreign financing increased during the
period. Between 1950 and 1972, the Philippines received only $326
million in World Bank assistance, but between 1972 and 1981, it
received more than $2.6 billion for 61 projects. Among the World
Bank's Third World recipients, it ranked 30th in cumulative accom-
modations. After martial law, it rose to 8th rank. 2s
28. See Bello, et al. (1982), p. 24.
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After the convening of the legislative assembly in 1978, the
official process contained some notable features designed to cir-
cumvent the paralyzing Congressional conflicts surrounding fiscal
policy. Instead of promulgating the budget himself, the President
submitted the budget, prepared under the auspices of the DBCC, to
the legislative body as the annual Appropriations Act. The legisla-
tive body had 45 working days within which to improve on the
budget. Otherwise, the budget as submitted by the President
prevailed.
The President had veto power which the legislature could
override with a two-thirds vote. The legislature did not have the
power to increase budget items, only to reduce them to any positive
value. It also had no power to abolish any government operations
(except implicitly by providing a ridiculously low funding. These
restrictions on the legislature were meant to remedy the problems
inherent in the pre-martial law fiscal process. But in combination
with other official provisions, these restrictions effectively removed
the power of fiscal policy from the legislature.
There were two important official restrictions. The first was
Amendment 6 to the 1973 Constitution which allowed the President
to pass legislation concurrently with the legislature. This gave the
President the power to counter the legislature's veto override of two-
thtrd's vote. The second restriction was PD 1177 which allowed the
President to reallocate budget items as he deemed appropriate. This
presiden_Aal power had force even after the legislature had formally
approved a fiscal budget.
This characteristic of the martial law period of fiscal decision
process was carried over In the post-martial law period. Even when
the legislature became officially operational in 1984, it never re-
gained the power to design expenditure and tax policy which it had
enjoyed under the 1935 Constitution.
Before martial law, the dominant control of the President's po-
litical party in Congress did not guarantee a consistent fiscal
program between the President and Congress. But in the present
system, all conflicts had been Internalized in the executive branch.
The fiscal decision process had relied heavily on the staff work
prodded by the Ministry of Finance, the NEDA, and the support
staffs of cabInet officials, with the fInance ministry staff playing the
'.cad role.
Since 1970, the agenda on expenditures had been dominated by
the need to respond to the foreign financing program to which the
Philippines had access. This was true especially after the 1974 off
crisis. A World Bank-led consultative group, which represented
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foreign countries (especially the US, Japan, and Arab countries}
and multilateral financing institutions such as the Asian Develop-
ment Bank {ADB). reviewed and approved foreign- financed projects
i0r the Philippines. This group coordinated both lending {such as by
export-import banks) and direct grants to the Philippines by other
countries.
Most of the tbreign-fmanced projects were public works. For
most of the 1970s, the country's infrastructure projects were
decided upon concurrently with the negotiation for their funding.
Almost all of these projects required counterpart funding from the
domestic budget. The economic downturn In the 1980s made
difficult the raising of the required domestic funding to complete
these projects, which were by nature multi-year, so that their
requirements spilled over into subsequent budgets.
Similarly, the agenda on tax reform had been dominated by the
need to respond to foreign financing. The country's IMF standby
programs in the 1970s provided targets for reducing the govern-
ment's budget deficit, thus creating pressure to Increase revenue
generation in the short run.
Another important ingredient of the executive fiscal process
after maI_clal lawwas the implicit agenda of the supporters of martial
law government, namely, tax exemptions and subsidy. Even before
martial law, the granting of tax exemptions and subsidized credit
was an accepted approach to finance development. The passage of
the investment and export incentives acts, which provided incen-
tives to pioneering and export-oriented enterprises, was the most
significant development-inspired fiscal change at that time. The
concentration of power in the President provided some flexibility
and responsiveness in instituting, through presidential decrees
and letters of Instructions, fiscal measures that directly influence
economic activities, such as special tax grants or tariff privileges.
Such privileges, granted to spur investments in vital areas of the
economy, have applied not only to government corporations but
also to private companies. 29
One of the immediate effects of martial law was the suppression
of severe factional conflicts over fiscal policy that have characterized
the Congressional _)rocess. Consequently, in the post-martial law
period, it became easier to resolve conflicts within smaller groups.
In many instances, conflicts were resolved by ensuring that affected
parties enjoyed a compensating advantage In another economic
29. De Dios 11984) has classified these decrees by economic sector,
providing a glimpse of the extent of this intervention.
30 FINANCING DEVELOPMENT
area. Understandably, thisgenerated a proliferationof interven-
tions.
The Consultation Process
We now discuss the process of consultation in post-martial law
decision-making. As explained above, the power of decision, then as
now, lay with the President. But fiscal decisions are made up from
details, such as tax rates, and laws have to be designed and drafted
even when power is concentrated in one person, This consultation
process will be described in this section based on interviews related
to this subject.
The consultation process has live stages: (1) initiation, (2) initial
design, (3) coordination with affected parties, (4) final decision, and
(5) implementation.
,Initiation
This means the origination of an idea in the fiscal process, In the
Philippine context, the idea can originate from representatives of
any of the groups concerned with fiscal policy.
An important aspect of origination is that while the country has
always operated based on a development plan, most development
plans do not represent a reconciliation and accommodation of the
different interests in society, They are often merely statements of
intentions of the executive branch. The intentions are not necessar-
ily inconsistent with each other. But because there is little effort in
determining whether the resources are sufficient to meet all the
goals, a development plan does not embody any decisions about
what intentions must be given up in order to achieve the more
important ones. 3°
Thus, initiation can start anywhere in the system. In actual
practice, initiatives from International lending agencies, such as the
World Bank and the IMF, have been important. These agencies
frequently start the process by commissioning local academics or
30. This is not to say that "prlorities" cannot he read out of development
plans. It only means that there is no social decision behind such a
statement of priorities, so that the stated priorities do not have any force in
guiding actual decisions. It is always convenient if some micro-decisions
can be justified from some statement in the development plan (and this is
relatively easy to do since development plans have tended to be comprehen-
sive in terms of intentions), but development plans have not prevented new,
unintended projects from being pursued.
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the research staffs of government agencies to study some Issues21
The IMF Initiatives have come in more direct form since the
country began to rely on standby loans. Such initiatives were often
in the form of advice, and were given in nggotigtlons where secrecy
was Inherent. Direct, public, and explicit advice from foreign agen-
cies was heavily discounted in the Philippine consultation process
even during martial law. But this did not take away the initiative
from these international agencies, which found representation in
the technocratic groups. These agencies have always expressed
frustration over the political decision process that allowed inappro-
priate policies to be pursued. The World Bank noted approvingly
that the proclamation of martial law and the abolition of Congress
provided the government with "an almost absolute power in the field
of economic development.'a2
In actual practice, the effect of this representation had been
minimal. The importance of technocratic influence varied directly
with the need for foreign financing of the chronic current accounts
deficits. This need was not yet significant when international com-
mercial banks sought to lend OPEC funds to the country In mid-
1970s. Even when foreign financing became important, the very
nature of the advice coming from international agencies could not
have elicited support from powerful-interests outside the bureauc-
racy. The IMF-World Bank's advocacy of anti-protectionism in .in-
dustry conflicted directly with the Interests of existing powerful
business groups and potential groups allied with the martial law
regime. Thus. these groups have consistently resisted deliberate
devaluation and tariff and tax reforms.
The word "minimal" is important here. Since the policies advo-
cated by international agencies were directed at intervening in favor
of the "whole" system, and since these policies conflicted directly
with the interests of big business groups, the technocrats did not
enjoy the support of these groups. Technocrats who came from the
academe also did not have the requisite domestic base.
in the martial law period, only a few of the initiatives have come
from organized business groups such as the PCCI. Most of the
31. For example, a large-scale project on Industrial protection poll cles-
summarlz_ed in Bauttsta, Power, and Associates (1979)--set the stage for
the tariff liberalization program financed by the World Bank in 1980.
Financing for this project came from government agencies, the Ford
Foundation, and the World Bank. Another agency whlch has funded many
research projects has been the U.S. Agency for international Development.
32. Bello, et al. (1982), p. 27.
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private initiatives came from individuals, and were in favor of
particular firms. The role of PCCI was generally relegated to react-
ing to these ip.dividual initiatives when the policies they have
successfully implemented conflicted with the interests of many
PCCI members. In most cases, because of the small domestic
market, the conflict was between the interest of one member as
against another. The PCCI had no basis for taking sides.
Initial Design
In the case of tax programs, there were two places where initial
designs took place. One was the National Tax Research Center
(NTRC). The other was the staff of the Prime Minister. In the post-
martial law period, the designs have responded to the IMF-World
Bank proposals. Programs of intemationai agencies have invariably
included a "technical assistance component." This was part of the
loan package meant to increase the capability of the affected govern-
ment agency to carry out research. It is fair to say that all tax
initiatives after 1976 have been designed by the said two staffs, with
the more comprehensive reforms, such as those pertaining ,to the
gross income tax system, coming from the NTRCo
The design of fiscal changes directly related to private interests
was generally initiated by individuals concerned. For example, the
coconut industry tax program was designed by a private law firm
(whose principal partner eventually became president of UP) with
the help of the minister of trade and industry and the top employ-
ees of the Philippine Coconut Authority. Government agencies
made extensive use of private research firms, especially when
foreign funds permitted subcontracting, to make studies and design
programs.
Consultation with Affected Parties
The consultation process was quite perfunctory, often non-ex-
istent, before the promulgation of a policy change. As noted above,
the system did not encourage coordination between government de-
partments. There was an almost weekly cabinet meeting presided
over by the Prime Minister to thresh out issues to be brought to the
President for promulgation. However, these meetings did not re-
solve many issues of coordination, and many who participate in
such meetings, including the Prime Minister, have felt frustration
over the fact that direct appeals to the President have often over-
turned or suspended cabinet decisions.
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From time to time, ad hoc committees with private sector repre-
sentation were created, but there has been no tradition of consul-
tation with the private sector as such. Similarly, there has been no
tradition of consultation with the press in the design of fiscal
policies, unlike in other countries.
But although consultation with groups outside the govmz_nent
tended to be minimal, this did not mean there was no private input.
In fact, there was tremendous private input in terms of sell
interested representation. There were standard channels In which
such inputting was carried out. Public hearings were held for tariff
changes, and consultation was conducted for the incentive priori-
ties list. Thus, for the tariff liberalization program, public hearings
were called before rates were changed, as required by law.
However, these consttltatlons were dominated by the need to
protect individual interests. They were not sensitive to the interests
of the private sector as a whole. The private sector did not have a
well-defined Interest as a sector {or as larger groups within the
private sector). This protection of individual interests also Involved
the need for advanced information about government intentions.
Again, access to information tended to be individual, based on
kinship and other close ties°
Suppression ol_ public criticism of the President's immediate
circie also shut off the relatively costless generation of information
from sectors of society that were being adversely affected by fiscal
decisions. The resulting decline in the quality of the declston
process was embodied in the rapid rise in the incremental output
ratio, aa
Final Decision
,In the martial law period, the President had the final power to
make fiscal decisions. Even with the retnstitution of the legislature,
the President retairmd the power to reallocate budget and to pass tax
legislation.
Such power assigned to one person has allowed the short-
cutting of the decision process. It becamepossible to approach the
President directly to issue decrees creating tax exemptions. It also
allowed mi_istries to directly Convince the President to change
expenditure allocations even without consultation with the affected
ministries. It became normal practice for the President to require,
for example, ministries to attain a 10 percent savings in their
33. See De Dtos (1984).
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current budget. The funds thereby saved were used for special
projects, notably those of the First Lady. The affected ministries
learned of the reasons for such measures only informally.
It was inherent in the decision process that the affected groups
often gave reactions only after a fiscal decision had been an-
nounced. Here, the President's vast power had been used to sus-
pend or amend the promulgated decision in response to complaints.
Implementation
The implementation of fiscal policy includes the actual collec-
tion of taxes and the disbursement of funds. In the latter, the
auditing function is important. Graft and corruption has always
been present in both the spending and taxing aspects of policy. This
seemed to ease somehow from the start of martial law up to about
1975, when an atmosphere of strict morality seemed to pervade the
government bureaucracy. In 1975, Marcos tried to retire a large
number of government employees for corruption. While many were
reinstated, including those with significant graft records, the epi-
sode demonstrated the power of martial law government and se-
cured the loyalty of those in service.
Exemptions and special treatment dominated the lmplementa-
tion of such a fiscal system. But after the onset of the current
economic crisis, all tax exemptions of government corporations
were removed by presidential decree, Exemptions for selected
enterprises were eventually reinstated, but it seemed that the most
inefficient ones have succeeded in getting re-exemptions. There was
an ad hoc committee where pleadings were made, but the President
had often decided independently of the recommendations of the
committee. Similarly, the tariff reform program had been con-
strained by special exemptions and redefinitions.
5
REFORMSONTHEFINANCINGSIDE
Ts section discusses and evaluates the reforms on
the financing side during the authoritariar_ period,
Tax Reforms
It is a reflection of the reformist power of the government in the
early period of martial law that "tax reforms" which never could have
been instituted under the previous socio-political arrangements
were finally adopted through Presidential Decrees under the new
dispensation. TM Reforms such as the revision of the tariff and the
internal revenue codes had been pending in several committees of
the Congress for years.
Kintanar puts the blame for this Congressional inaction on the
fact that these relbrms invariably increased the tax burden on the
=wealthier classes of society--the landowning class, the industrial-
ists, and commercial interests--who were heavily represented in
both Houses of the Congress."35
The development imperative on the financing side was the
raising of the country's tax efforts. 3s We now discuss the efforts
taken toward this during the post-martial law period.
Tariff Reforms
One of the first acts of the martial law government was the
reform in 1972 of the tariff and customs code through PD 34. This
34. Ktntanar (1976), p. 1.
35. Ibid., p. 2.
36. See also Slcat (1971).
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reform simplified the system of classification by reducing the
number of categories and the number of tariff rates. The new code
provided for only six rates: 10, 20, 30, 50, 70, and 100 percent. The
new code reduced the applicability of the catch-all category of
"others," which was the basis of much discretion and abuse of the
customs law.
The code had grown by accretion since last modified in 1957. It
was promulgated after some consultation with businessmen who
successfully objected to the reduction in maximum tariff rates for
finished products and to the Increase in tariff rates for industrial
inputs, as reflected In the staffdraft plan. It is important to note that
both Ft!ipino and foreign companies objected to the reduction in
maximum tariff rates.
Subsequent efforts at trade tax gave rise to conflict between the
technocrats and the entrenched big business. They also provided
an Interesting illustration of how_a program's objectives might be
achieved in reims of targets but not so in reality.
The IMF has had a long-standing interest in tariff reform as a
strategy to improve resource allocation In the PhilippInes. The IMF
adjustment programs in 1962, 1970, and 1973 all contained some
elements of tariff reforms, such as the removal of specific import
controls, a reduction in the number of tariff rates, and the lowering
of specific rates. In 1976, the IMF tried another tariff reform by
offering the Philippines an Extended Fund Facility (EFF) program.
By 1978, the IMF had admitted failure in these efforts, 3Twhich were
successfully resisted by businessmen close to the then Central
Bank Governor Gregorio Ltcaros, who was not a technocrat, _8
In 1980, after the second off. price shock, the need for foreign
savings became critical again. This allowed the technocrats repre-
senting the Philippine government to conclude a structural adjust-
ment loan {SAL) with the World Bank for a tariff liberalization
program. In 1981, Jaime Laya, a technocrat, became Central Bank
governor after a serious financial scandal involving an associate of
the previous governor.
The objective of the program was to reduce the average tariff
rates from 43 percent in 1980 to 28 percent in 1985. It called for a
reduction in the peak rates of from 70 and 100 percent to 50 percent.
In terms of overall objectives, the program targets were achieved on
37. See Thompson (1985):
38. See Bello, et al. (1982), Chapter 6; Thompson (1984); and Broad
(i983).
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schedule. The President's capalcfllty to rule by decree allowed the
prompt implementation of scheduled tariff reductions so that even
the Intemlediate objectives were attained to the letter.
It is difficult, however, to conclude absolutely that the tariff
reduction program attained its objectives in spirit because of other
policies that gained in importance during the same period. First.
there was a proliferation of decrees exempting specific corporations
from all customs duties, so that the drop in overall average tariffwas
a poor measure of the extent of liberalization.
An example of a corporation that was granted tariff exemption
was the Philippine Veterans Investment and Development Com-
pany (PHIVIDEC), a government corporation created from the pen-
sion funds of military retirees. This corporation engaged in signifi-
cant tax-free importation of finished products (such as tires and
appliances) Which it then sold to favored companies. Another
example was NMCO, a private company, which was granted the
privilege to import television sets tax free to support a program of
increasing the use of television in the countryside. NIVICO eventu-
ally participated in the domestic commercial market for TV sets. _9
Second, import controls on many items were put in place as the
Board of Investments and other agencies reserved certain indus-
tries as priorities for "industry rationalization." For example, the
importation of kerosene engines, and of raw materials, parts, and
components for electronic products were controlled by the Board of
Investments. Similarly, the importation of raw cotton was con-
trolled by the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) to protect
the local cotton industry.
Tax Incentives
The use of tax incentives to pursue fiscal and development
policy is well entrenched in the Philippine fiscal system. As early as
1948, Republic Act 35 granted "new and necessary industries"
exemptions from some internal revenue taxes for a period of four
years. 4° These types of incentives were extended in subsequent
legislations until the promulgation of the Investment Incentives Act
in 1967. This law, passed during Marcos' first term, created the
Board of Investments, which determined which ventures could
qualify for incentives. 41
39. Slcat (1984), cites these cases.
40. From Manasan (1982), which also contains a valuable summary of
the history of Incentives.
41. Sicat (1967) explained the rationale of the new approach.
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With the use of the President's law-making power under martial
law, these incentives were eventually extended to exports, agricul-
ture, and other specific ventures° After martial law, PD 135 ex-
tended the incentives to chemical fertil_ers, PD 237 to mining, PD
535 to tourism, and PD 1167 to construction. Powerful members of
the martial law coalition benefitted from these extensions of incen-
tives. For example, the construction industry incentives were en-
acted when the company of Rodolfo Cuenca, a Marcos associate,
became deeply involved in overseas construction projects.
Serf-Financed Programs
The numerous claims against the potential and actual tax
revenue of the government created pressure on the government to
undertake programs that were purposely self-financed. One was the
"Alay Lakad" (Walk for a Cause) program of the Ministry of Social
Services and Development (MSSD), which was intended to raise
funds for self-employment projects of out-of-school youths.
A more controversial self-financed program was the coconut
industry development program, or CIDP. The coconut industry is a
key Philippine industry. Coconut products rank second in export
earnings and, on the average, constitute about 15 percent of
merchandise exports. In spite of such importance, there had been
no public effort to improve the productivity of the industry until
1973.
The hypothetical basis for the CIDP was that the required
productivity development could be financed from what in effect
would be a levy, on exports. At that time, the Philippines controlled
at least 65 percent of the world coconut and copra markets, and it
was presumed that the levy would be borne by foreign consumers.
This turned out to be erroneous. The world market demonstrated its
ability to shift to other vegetable oil substitutes when a newly
formed tmifled marketing operation tried to restrict exports of
coconut products in 1979. Subsequent developments in the indus-
try resulted in a monops0ny in the domestic trading of coconut
products. Thus, the collections to the industry development fund
were borne principally by coconut farmers. 42
Because the coconut levy was legally a contribution by its
intended beneficiaries to a private fund, the CIDP qualifies, at least
in principle, as a self-financed program in which interested parties
42. Clarete and Roumasse{ (1983) demonstrated that the _tax" fell
principally on the farmers.
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contribute to its financing. The evolution of this program under-
scored its private character. PD 755 authorized the diversion of part
of the coconut le_ey fund (the part that had been allocated for
"investment') for the purchase of a private commercial bank which
was organized into the United Coconut Planters Bank, or UCPB. The
coconut fund, thus, held 70 percent of the bank for the farmers, who
could then exchange their levy receipts for shares of stocks in the
bank. The remaining 30 percent of the stock came under control of
a group headed by Eduardo Cojuangco, who also had a strong hand
in helping the President choose who would be appointed to the
board that controls the fund. In practice, it proved difficult to
distribute the shares of stocks to the unorganized coconut farmers.
They were dispersed throughout the country and, in many cases,
could not produce levy receipts.
Thus, the private bank ("private" because it was now hypotheti-
cally owned by fan_aers and a private group) became the principal
instrument of the coconut program. In 1978, PD 1468 created the
Coconut Industry Investment Fund (CIIF) from a portion of the levy
fund. Using CIIF fund, the UCPB proceeded to control 70 percent of
the industry's milling capacity, which was consolidated under the
fLrm United Cocon.ut Mills (UNICOM), created through Letter of
Instruction (LOI)926 by President Marcos. The LOI enjoined all
government agencies to give full support to the company and
prohibited the entry of new firms into the industry. Thus, UNICOM
became the largest buyer of copra m_d seller of coconut oil.
Between August 1973 and August 1982 (when the levy was
suspended), the CIDP has accumulated fund amounting to 1)9.7
billion. Of this amount, P2.6 billion went to the acquisition of
industry milling capacity under the CIIF; P2.1 billion financed a
program to subsidize the purchase by coconut farmers of cooking
oil, laundry and bar soap, filled milk, and animal feeds; P1.1 billion
went to planting hybrid seednuts in 55,000 hectares; and about
P0.8 million for socio-economtc projects among the farmers. The
rest of the fund went to various purposes, Including additional
equity to UCPB and donation to a children's hospital project of the
First Lady. UCPB then had to meet some equity requirements In
order to become a full-service commercial bank. Thus, from a minor
bank before acquisition, it grew into the largest domestic bank in
terms of assets. In 1984, Eduardo Cojuangco, through the UCPB,
purchased controlling interest in San Miguel Corporation, the
country's largest Filipino corporation.
Because the coconut program was a private, seK-financed
operation, its funds were not subject to government audit. The
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coconut industry policy was the subject of much infighting in the
Marcos group as the internationally minded technocrats tried to
remove the legal underpinnings of the program.
On 27 May 1980, the levy was suspended. Because it was
collected as a fixed amount on quantity, _3 the sharp fall in world
copra prices at that time caused much suffering in the countryside.
But President Marcos resumed the collection of levy 45 days later,
under a slightly different name. The resumption was purportedly in
response to the clamor by farmers as expressed by the private
industry group, which was led by coconut businessmen close to the
government.
in 1981, the levy was suspended for a month and then was
resumed under still another different name. In January 1982, the
levy was changed to respond to the level of copra prices. In August,
it was again suspended.
The IMF-World Bank and the internationally minded techno-
crats have often resisted effo_s to increase Filipino control of the
coconut industry through the CIDP. In 1983, the World Bank
proposed to fund a coconut replanting program. 44 The group in
control of the coconut industry eventually rejected it. Under the
1984-1986 IMF program, the dismantling of the monopoly control
over domestic trading was a _qualitattve criterion." The Aquino
government proceeded to remove the coconut monopoly upon
assuming power.
Evaluation of Tax Refol-iiis
By 1981, the post-marUal law government had succeeded in
consolidating, simplifying, and codifying the tax system of the
country. Many ofthese reforms had been impossible to achieve in
Congress. The furious pace with which many of the original reforms
were carried out in the beginning seemed to hold promise that the
tax system could be reformed so that the tax revenues would
become consistent with development goals. In 19 72, taxes made up
11.2 percent of GNP. 4sIn 1983, the figure had increased to only 11.9
percent, and went down to 10.0 percent in 1984, the first full year
43. At the start, P 150 per metric ton of copra; but in 1980, it was already
equivalent to an e:_port tax of P1,000 per metric ton).
44. The World Bank was to be paid back through an export tax on
coconut product exports, so that it appeared as ffthe World Bank was not
only proposing to impose another distortion but also proposing to replace
t_he lor_d group as a collector of the levy.
45. Using the tax revenue estimates in the national accounts.
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of the present balance-of-payments crisis. For the period 1975-
1984, total tax revenue averaged 10.8 percent of GNP {Table 9}.
At the end of the period, the tax system had not been freed from
its heavy reliance on taxes on goods and services and on interna-
tional trade. Targf reforms had reduced total national taxes derived
from these two sources from 75.0 percent in 1975 to 66.7 percent in
1984. In 1983 and ],984. however, other taxes which were domi-
nated by temporary surcharges on imports increased to 7.3 percent
of total taxes, so that the government also tended to depend on these
types of taxes {Table 10). Property taxes collected never exceeded 0.9
percent of GNP and averaged only 0.2 percent of GNP between 1975
and 1984 {Table 9). Taxes on Income averaged 2 percent of GNP
before martial law. They increased to an average of 2.5 percent after
martial law due to tax amnesty, but this was not sufficient to reduce
dependence on indirect taxes.
Table 9
Tax Revenues as Percentage of GNP
Taxes on Taxes On Taxes On
Net Income Domestic Goods International Taxes on Other Total Tax
Year and Profit and Services Trade Property Taxes Revenue
1975 2.8 8.2 5.8 .02 ,19 12.01
1976 3.2 4.7 3,7 .11 .23 11.95
1977 3.0 4,0 3.2 .06 ,76 11,00
1978 1.9 4.1 4,8 .95 ,15 11.97
1979 2.5. 4,3 4.9 .28 .21 12.33
1980 2.8 4.1 4.4 _21 .22 11.76
1981 2,5 3.7 3.7 .10 .58 10.52
1982 2,5 3.7 3_6 .11 ,24 10.16
1983 2_3 2.9 4_2 .03 .73 10.31
1984 2,4 3.2 3.2 .02 ,70 9.49
Total 2.54 3,65 3.96 .15 .46 10.78
The failure to achieve the necessary increase in resources
mobilization can be attributed to the severe constraints (as will be
discussed below) placed by the country's political economy on the
authoritarian government. These constraints weakened efforts to
raise tax and collection rates on real property and on personal
Income. They also led to the proliferation of tax and tariff exemp-
tions. Although collection rates improved in the first few years of
martial law, they eventually declined as corruption consistently
worsened after 1976,
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Table 10
Ta_ Sources as Percentage of Total Tax Revenues
Taxes on Taxes on Taxes on
Net Income Domestic Goods International Taxes on Other Total Tax
Year and Profit and Services Trade Property Taxes Revenue
1975 23.11 26,34 48.'73 ,21 1.6 100
1976 2.6.39 89.40 31,35 .96 1.9 10O
1977 27.50 36.50 28,59 .50 6.9 100
1978 16.05 34,30 40.38 8.0 1,3 100
1979 20,64 35.45 39.90 2.3 1.7 100
1980 23.82 35.01 37,48 1.8 1.9 10O
1981 23.92 84,78 34.82 ,96 5,5 100
1982 24.89 36.76 34.98 1.1 2.3 1O0
1983 22.75 28.80 41.12 .26 7,1 100
1984 2S.84 33,30 33.47 .21 7,4 100
Total 23.62 33.93 36.79 1,42 4.28 100
Let us now discuss more thoroughly the politico-economic
constraints on the martial law government. 46
When martial law was declared in 1972, the Marcos government
faced resistance not only from the lower classes of society but also
from the elite groups, whose political power lay in Congress. The
latter's resistance was no less threatening to the stability of the
authoritarian experiment than that posed by the radical and under-
ground groups, 47
As has been explained in previous chapters, while Congress
seemed ineffective In addressing the development imperatives of
Philippine society, it effectively served as the means by which the
landlord and industrial classes protected and reconciled the_
occasionally conflicting interests. Marc0s" dissolution of Congress
effectively shut offthe majority of elite classes from political partici-
pation. The authoritarian government detained many members of
Congress and delegates to the Constitutional convention that was
then in session. Those who demonstrated unwillingness or inability
to resist the new government were released. Some of them were
actually won over by the new government, at least temporarily, and
cooperated in the completion of the 1973 constitution.
The permanent objectors to the martial experiment, which
included Senator Benigno Aquino, were never released or spent
46. Many of the ideas presented here have been discussed in De Dios
and Monies (1985).
47. In 1972, the Communist Party was geographically concentrated
and had less than a thousand members. At that time, moreover, the military
did not have a distinct political personality.
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longer time in prison. The Lopez family, one of whose members was
Marcos' vice president, never reconciled with the experiment and
were constrained to divest themselves of their domestic income-
earning assets--which included a newspaper-TV chain and the
electric utility for Metropolitan Manila.
The declaration of land reform for rice lands all over the country
one month after the declaration of martial law 48held out the promise
that the authoritarian government would attempt to dismantle the
feudal basis of political power in the country and, thus, provide the
permanent basis for this government. But the reform was never
extended to other croplands, and in 1975, a decree exempted rice
landholdings of seven hectares and less from land reform. This
effectively exempted 67 percent of the total nceland.
To sustain political control and the operation of the bureau-
cratic machinery, the authoritarian government needed to create its
own social base. Because of the constrained parameters within
which it had to operate, it ultimately had to create its own loyal
followers or elite groups.
The question was, from which constituency would this social
base be formed? The dominant families before martial law were on
the opposition. While they could be expected to continue to operate
their domestic income-earning assets, they also could not be
counted upon to participate in the new government.
The disadvantaged groups--peasants, workers, and small busi-
nessmen--presented an attractive alternative. The announcement
of land reform was seen as an effort in this direction. However, given
the entrenched economic power of the elite opposition, it would
probably have been foolhardy at that time to consider these groups
as a core of a stable and immediately dependable social base. As
explained earlier, these groups were not well organized. Their
members have not beenactive participants in the country's political
life, except for some who have engaged in insurgency. Any serious
effort to draw in support from these groups would have required
accommodating their interests, which certainly would invite reac-
tion from the elite. Such an accommodation would have required a
thoroughgoing land reform program that would reduce the holdings
of the landlord class and the dismantling of the protectionist system
that favored large businessmen.
That the government bureaucracy did not have a distinct
personality and that the military then was neither capable of taking
over some civilian duties nor did it have a political orientation meant
48. The decree was issued in the President's own handwriting.
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that the social base had to be created from outside the state
machinery. To the extent that the authoritarian experiment threat-
ened the sanctity of the Constitution which the officers' corps have
had a long tradition of defending, the military support for the
experiment was unstable and, at best, temporary. The idea of most
military officers was that the necessary restructuring of society
would not take very long, and a return to normal civilian processes
would be undertaken as soon as reforms were carried out. In any
case, the "necessary restructuring" of society was not conceived of
by the military supporters as leading to the permanency of political
power in the Marcos family and their allies.
Thus, the authoritarian government had to create its own
reliable social base from a new group, a "new elite." The formation
of this new elite made necessary the diversion of resources in favor
of its members. This diversion was done by "bending the rules" or
by creating new rules that conferred "exceptional" privileges to the
members of this new elite. The word exceptional is important,
because changing only the rules, which could apply to all, would
have provided advantage to those already dominant during the pre-
martial law period.
The rapid formation of a coalition of the new elite was not
surprising under a political process in which stable political parties
did not operate. The stability and strength of the new coalition
depended heavily on the economic benefits conferred to it. At }_he
same time, as the technocrats in government have learned to
accept, the authoritarian powers of the President could not be used
to withdraw these privileges since this could destabilize the regime.
In fact, as the challenge to the regime mounted, the conferring of
these economic benefits became a more critical necessity. In the
twilight years of the Marcos regime, the First Lady's relatives and
allies became more powerful because of this process.
The politico-economic parameters within which the authoritar-
ian government had to operate explain the most important features
of the evolution of the tax side of fiscal policy in the post-martial law
period. The government had enough power to override the technical
and obstructionist objections in Congress. This power enabled the
government to codify and simplify tax laws and administration.
Moreover, it had enough power to carry out a tariff liberalization
program, which would have been impossible during pre-martial
law.
However, the authoritarian government did not have enough
power to threaten the economic power of the dominant groups
during pre-martial law. That explains why effective increases in tax
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rates could not be undertaken simultaneously with codification.
That also explains why the system of incentives, which threatened
the tax base, could not be rationalized during the period. Apart from
the continued expansion of coverage, the only change in the
incentives system was its codification in 1981.
The authoritarian government had enough power to grant
exceptional privilege in terms of tax and tariff exemptions, and to
impose quasi-public taxation such as the coconut levy in favor of its
social allies. These allies provided political support in terms of such
activities as referenda and election exercises. The resources con-
solidated under these privileges also financed the buying out of the
assets of the pre-martial law elite. In a sense, the purchase by
CoJuangco of the country's largest Filipino corporation can be seen
as a culmination of the effort to reduce the power of the old elite.
The requirements that attended the creation of a new social base
also explain the post-martial law developments on the expenditure
side of public finance, as will be discussed in the next chapter.
6
REFORMSONTHEEXPENDITURESIDE
The development imperative that confronted the martial
law government on the expenditure side was the need to increase
the rate of capital investment. A program to raise public expendi-
tures on investment was successful. In 1970, public expenditures
on investment was only 1.5 percent of GNP; by 1979 it had been
raised to 7 percent.
Almost 50 percent (46.4 percent between 1979 and 1984) of the
national government's capital expenditure was directed at utilities
development and road transport construction (Table 11). Energy
development was considered a priority investment area in response
to the off shocks of the 1970s. Agricultureand social services had
very low priorities. Table 11 shows that between 1979 and 1984 the
debt repayment burden of the national government had increased
nine times. The unimpeded ability to contract foreign debt, which
was so difficult under pre-martial law procedures, was crucial.
Favorable international developments, especially the unprece-
dented availability of international commercial lending after the
first oil shock, helped efforts to raise public investments. As in other
countries, the bottleneck that had to be overcome was the absorp-
tive capacity of the economy, especially since the private sector had
limited capability to absorb. The constraintin the private sector was
that only a few companies had sufficient international reputation to
be able to borrow on their Own account. But these companies were
so large domestically and had access to locally available subsidized
credits that they did not have to use foreign credits in substantial
amounts.
The response of the Philippine government was to increase the
rate of borrowing on its own account for infrastructure projects and
48 FI/qANCING DEVELOPMENT
Table 11
National Government Capital Expenditure
on its Own Account by Sector, 1979-84
(In million peach, obllgstlon basis)
1979 1980 1981 1962 1983 Est. 1984
ECONOMIC SERVICES 4,818 6,737 6,256 6,130 7,391 4,713
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishery 830 782 509 641 993 544
General administration, regulation, and research 179 226 84 211 423 208
AgricuJture 600 483 484 392 463 292
Stabilization of farm prices and income -- -- -- 2 -- --
Extension progr,,rns 14 15 23 9 9 7
Irrigation 530 366 892 380 443 280
Other agriculture 56 102 69 1 11 5
Forestry and hunting 14 15 25 7 20 18
Fishing 37 68 16 31 92 26
industry, Trade, Labor, and Tourism 63 41 64 83 213 9
Labor, Wage, and Employment Programs O 1 18 2 4 1
Mining 8 1 8 0 1 0
Manufacturing 18 14 18 1 1 1
Construction 0 0 1 0 8 0
Tourism ......
Commerce 2 2 2 3 4 6
Others 35 23 17 27 200 1
Utilities and Infrastructure 3,925 5,914 5,563 5,456 6,180 4,160
Generaladministration, regulation, and research 1,178 1,511 1,786 1,862 2,161 1,545
Electricity 203 165 450 1 3 0
Water supply 565 390 329 383 443 279
Roads and road transport 1,847 3,219 3,004 3,111 3,464 2,265
Other transport 132 623 8 85 100 62
Water transpod 125 84 7 85 99 62
Air transport 7 539 1 0 1 O
Communications 6 0 0 9 2 5
Other utilities and infrastructure O 6 6 5 7 4
SOCIAL SERVICES 880 944 662 799 2,212 1,177
Education 326 348 409 494 515 462
General administration, regulation, and research 99 90 123 156 155 117
Schools 136 173 151 187 206 214
Primary and intermediate 102 140 112 144 168 171
Secondary 34 33 39 43 48 43
Universities and colleges 64 58 75 102 101 75
Technical, vocational, and others 5 5 18 13 18 26
Subsidiary services 22 22 42 36 35 28
Housing and Community Amenities 422 437 192 151 1,543 528
Housing 205 206 96 150 1,542 527
Community development 217 232 6 1 1 1
Health 119 111 84 115 97 138
General administration, regulation, and research 8 7 6 7 6 8
Hospitals and clinics 60 57 36 52 39 65
Individual health services 40 36 23 33 26 39
Family planning 1 1 12 14 19 11
Others 10 1(3 7 9 7 10
Social Security and Welfare O 4 5 3 6 2
Other Social Sewices 13 44 62 36 52 52
DEFENSE 463 319 384 240 462 194
GENERAL PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 228 383 361 523 436 579
DEBT SERVICE (repayments) 524 1,266 1,418 1,660 2,389 4,690
TOTAL 6,913 9,649 9,081 9,352 12,889 11,353
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to create corporations that could enter into debt contracts. Thus,
public sector foreign borrowing was the leading sector in the 1970s
(Table 12). From 1974 to 1983, total debt grew at 23.9 percent per
year. Total medium term debt grew at 12.4 percent per year. but the
public portion of this grew at 16.5 percent per year. Total long-term
debt grew at 23,5 percent per year, with the public portion of it at
30.4 percent per year. Total short-term debt grew at 23.5 percent per
year, with its public sector portion at 77.7 percent per year.
As a strategy, foreign borrowing was especially converdent
because it allowed a rise in investment rate while brmging in the
needed balance-of-payments financing. But a new unfavorable
international credit environment stopped this strategy. Based on a
World Bank mission estimate, the country's incremental capital
output ratio increased from 3.9 in 1970-1979 to 10.6 in 1980-1983.
This section will take as a case-study one of the main elements
in the government strategy to raise public capital investment--the
rise of the public corporate sector.
Table 12
External Debt Outstanding and Disbursed at End-Year,
By Maturity and Borrower
I (In_ mllll°nl dollars at end of perlodl I
1974 1975 1976 1977 1976 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 d "_;!,i
Short-terrn Oredits/_ 331 4,36 715 1,009 1,35, 1,8,4 _,548 3,6C_, 4,046 4,071 !][i[[!.
Public Sector 11 29 147" 267 330 566 947 1,862 2,149 1,938
Private Sector 320 409 568 742 1,027 1,248 1,601 1,802 1897 2,133
Medium-Term Credits b 355 398 456 481 395 442 728 868 856 1,013 i;ii!
Public Sector 217 234 295 354 258 357 654 783 717 859
Private Sector 138 164 161 127 137 85 74 85 139 154
Long-TermOredits c 2,037 2,567 3,928 5,073 6,443 7,478 8,911 10,392 12,153 13,631 ;==ili[
Public Sector 962 1,320 2,277 3,036 4,489 5,492 6,531 7,716 9,063 10,493
Private Sector 1,078 1,247 1,651 2,037 1,954 1,986 2,380 2,676 3,090 3,138
MLT Debt--Subtotal 2,392 2,965 4,384 6,554 6,838 7,920 9,639 11,260 13,009 14,644 -
Public Sector 1,179 1,554 2,572 8,390 4,747 5,849 7,185 8,499 9,780 11,352
Private Sector 1,213 1,411 1,812 2,164 2,091 2,071 2,454 2,761 3,229 3,292
i'i'i_
(of which IMF drawings) (128) (239) (452) (551) (639) (783) (1,083) (1,282) (1,073) (1,133)-
',Consists of revolving credits and fixed4erm credits with originaI maturity el up _o one year, exch.rd[n 9 Centre! Bank
compensatory financing.
=Original malurlfy of 1-5 years.
_Original maturity exceeding 5 years.
dpreliminary.
Note: "Public" refers to debt of 1he Republic of the Phi;ippines, government corporations, government financial ins[i[utions.
and includes transactions with IMF, "Private" refers to all direct loans to the private sector, including those guaranteed
by governmeflt financial institutions.
Source= Central Bank of the Philippines
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Case Study: The Public Corporate Sector
Definition and Macroeconomic Significance
One of the most prominent features of the fiscal history of the
Philippines in the martial law period was the rise of the public
corporate sector. This sector had come under increasing scrutiny
because of the heavy debt burden that now attends its operations.
The government's reorganization commission had been directed to
concentrate its efforts on determining the correct strategy to be
applied to this sector in the future. This sector was an innovation of
the post-martial law period. It was only in the 1974-1977 Develop-
ment Plan that an explicit policy and a planned investment program
on this sector was articulated.
The Philippine government defines public enterprises as "corpo-
rate bodies, stock or non-stock, owned or controlled by the govern-
ment and created by special law under the corporation law for the
purpose of performing governmental or proprietary functions which
are socio-economic in nature." As Manasan (1984) points out, this
definition differs from the economic conception, but when it is
applied the resulting list of enterprises does not differ significantly
from a list that might be constructed from an economic definition,
The official definition excludes such non-economic corporations as
the Boy Scouts of the Philippines or the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.
Based on this definition, there is currently a total of 245 public
sector corporations, broken down as 96 parent companies and 149
Table 13
Sectoral Distribution of Government Corporations, 1985 a
Percentage Percentage Percentage
Sector Parent Distribution Subsidiary Distribution Total Distribution
1. Agriculture, Forestry, Fishery 5 5.2 15 10.1 20 8.2
2. Mining and Ciuarrying 0 0.0 8 5;.4 8 8.3
3. Manufacturing 6 6.2 41 27,5 47 19,2
4. Construction O 0,0 4 2,7 4 1.6
5. Electricity, Gas, al'ld water 4 4.2 2 1.3 6 2.4
6, Transportation, Communication,
and Storage . 10 10.4 15 10,1 25 10.2
• 6,1, Communication 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
7. Trade 6 6.2 12 8.1 18 7,3
8. Financing and Housing 25 26.0 17 1'1.4 44, 18.0
8.1. Financing 22 22.9 17 11.4 39 15.9
8.2. Housing 3 3,1 12 8,1 15 6.1
9, Service 40 41.7 23 15.4 63 2&7
Total 91 100,0 149 100,0 245 100.0
aExcludingacquiredassets,
Source: Manasan(1986),Table 1.
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subsidiaries.In 1970,therewere only35.Thus, the phenomenon of
government corporationscan be properlyassociatedwith the post-
martiallaw period.To be sure,the grossvalue added ofgovernment
corporationsgrew fasterthan the economy between 1975 and 1984.
Public enterprise output grew at 24.6 percent per year, as against
14.1 percent for (nominal) gross domestic product (Manasan, 1985).
Of the total government corporations, 25.7 percent can be
classified under the services sector (Table 13). This does not reflect
preponderance of size or conscious government policy. The Ministry
of Human Settlements, headed by the First Lady Imelda Marcos, has
been particularly aggressive in spinning oK its operations into
corporations, where it would be subject to less cumbersome dis-
bursement and audit rules.
The government also has a preponderant presence in the finan-
cial sector, under which 15.9 percent of public corporations can be
classified, and in manufacturing, comprised of 19,2 percent of
government corporations. 49
In terms of current presence in the economy, Manasan (1985)
has documented the increasing participation of government corpo-
rations. The measure she used was the proportion of sectoral gross
value added that could be attributed to government corporations. In
the financial sector, the proportion contributed by the government
increased from 51.3 percent in 1975 to 84.1 percent in 1984 (Table
14). This was attributed to the fact that the govemment-owned PNB
accounted for 30 percent of commercial bank assets, while the DBP
and the Land Bank accounted for 20 percent of the total assets of
banking institutions (Lamberte, 1985; Table 15). For electricity,
gas, and water, the government corporations' share of gross value
added increased from 25.9 percent in 1975 to 60.1 percent in 1984.
In some industries where government corporations had no
presence in 1975, there is now a discernible government participa-
tion (see Table 14). This is true for mining/quanytng and construc-
tion. As a whole, "the public corporate sector's share in Gross
Domestic Product increased from 3.4 percent in 1975, peaked at 6,1
percent in 1983, and dropped to 5.2 percent in 1984. "s° A new
balance-of-payments crisis started in 1983.
Investment in government corporations made impressive the
rate of capital formation. Between 1978 and 1984, the capital
49. The sources from these breakdowns are Manasan and Buenaven-
tura (1986) and Amaton_, et al., (1985),
50. Manasan (1986), p. 13.
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Table 14
Percentage Share of Government Corporations to Sectoral Gross
Value Added, 1975-1984
fAt current prices)
Sector 1975 1980 1984
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishery 1.3 0.4 0.5
Mining and Quarrying -- 0.1 2.6
Manufacturing 1.1 1.6 1.7
Construction -- 0.1 0.8
Electricity, Gas, and Water 25.9 54.4 69.1
Transport, Communications, and Storage 1.0 2.4 2.5
Trade 1.4 1.7 0.8
Financing 51.3 64.4 84.1
Housing 0.2 1.0 0.6
Services 1.0 0.1 0.9
Source:Manasan(1986),Table 3.
Table 15
Capital Expenditures of 15 Major Non-financial Government
Corporations and Gross Domestic Capital Formation, 1978-1984
(In million pesos)
Capital Expenditures Gross Domestic
of 15 Government Capital
Corporations Formation (1) + (2)
Year ( ) (2) (percent)
1978 7,281 51,348 14.4
1979 9,518 67,687 16.2
1980 11,979 81,153 9.4
1981 15,293 93,261 16.4
1982 15,828 96,521 15.6
1983 19,449 184,414 18.6
! 984 15,282 188,820 15.2
1978-1984 92,930 595,204 15.6
Source:Manasan(1986),Table7.
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expenditures of 15 major government corporations never went
below 9.4 percent of total gross domestic capital formation and
averaged 15.6 percent (Table 15). The largest investments were in
energy projects, which were in turn dominated by the $1.9 billion
nuclear power plant project.
Fiscal Burden of Government Corporations
The public's contributions to these corporations include prefer-
ential tariffs and monopoly profits. These are difficult to measure. In
the subsequent discussion, we will utilize the government, s budg-
etary contributions as a measure of public sector burden.
Under the Philippine fiscal system, there are three kinds of
government contributions to these corporations: (1) current trans-
fers. (2) equity contributions, and (3) ne t lending. Current transfers
are direct subsidies for costs of current operations, such as salaries
of personnel. Equity contributions are the shares of stock the
government receives, based on the value of its contribution, from
the corporation. Net lending represents loans net of repayments to
these corporations from the government.
The distinctions between these three types of contributions in
terms of their differential effects on the fiscal burden have been
blurred by actual practice. Theoretically, amounts lent out by the
national government to government corporations are meant to be
repaid. However, information we have gathered mformaily have
convinced us that almost none of the amounts lent out have been
repaid. The repayment rate is much less than 5 percent of the
amounts lent out. There have been cases in which the amount
originally lent has been converted into equity contributions. Area-
tong, et al. (1985, p. 3) also point out that, except for two or three.
public enterprises have not remitted dividends on the paid equity of
the national government and have generally applied equity contri-
butions to their current operating expenditures.
Given these considerations, we can only rely on budget docu-
ments to classify the types of contributions made to government
corporations. The first are "current contributions," which are budget
items intended for "maintenance and operating expenses." Then
there are "capital contributions," which are all other contributions.
Using. this approach, we can see that total budgetary contributions
to government corporations grew from less than 4.8 percent of
budgetary receipts in 1975 to 17.8 percent in 1984. In 1982, the last
full budget year before the current economic crisis, these contribu-
t_ions peaked at 24.4 percent (Table 16).
Over 90 percent of these contributions were "capital contribu-
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Table 16
Annual Budgetary Contributions to Government Corporations,.
Cash Basis
(In million pesos and percent)
Total as Percent of
Contribution
Budgetary Budgetary
Year Current Capital Total Expenditures Receipts
1975 285 522 807 4.4 4.8
1976 392 1,804 2,196 10.7 12.1
1977 246 2,252 2,498 10.9 12.5
1978 632 2,245 2,877 11.0 12.0
197£ 478 3,391 3,869 13.0 13.1
1980 505 4,739 5,244 13.8 15.1
1981 564 7,862 8,426 17.5 23.4
1982 889 8,419 9,308 17.7 24.4
1983 586 4,821 5,407 10.2 11.6
1984 429 9,819 10,248 15.4 17.8
Total 5,006 45,878 50,880 13.5 15.8
Source:Amatong,Beltran,and Boncodin(1985)
tions" that, in the nature of the process, were never expected to be
repaid. Thus, while theoretically it is inappropriate to consider all of
the capital contributions as part of the burden in the current year,
in practice the budgetary burden of these corporations has in-
creased permanently since they have incurred losses, have not paid
dividends, and have been unable to service the foreign debt they
have incurred, Of the total contributions, 90.9 percent went to
"economic" oriented corporations, with the power sector getting 33
percent, the financial sector 23 percent, agriculture 13 percent, and
industry 11 percent, s_
The pattern of equity contributions (Table 17) reflects the
government priorities, especially before 1981. Tl_ese were power
generation (National Power Corporation and National Electrifica-
tion Administration) and housing. After 1981, the priorities were
not so clear anymore as equit3r contributions increased in almost all
sectors.
These contributions have had significant effects on the increas-
51. Amatong, et al. (1985), p, 26.
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Table 17
National Government Equity Contributions by Recipient, 1978-1984
(In million pesos, Cash Basis)
Actual
1878 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 Total
Government Flnan_ial Instltutlon8
and Credit Programs 461 446 400 1,404 2;247 205 5,163
Central Bank 26 37 38 583 325 25 1,034
DBP 105 76 85 300 607 -- 1,173
DBP Rural Bank Trust Fund -- 5 .... 5
Philippine National Bank 100 100 72 210 160 150 792
Land Bank of the Philippines 30 110 14.0 -- 125 30 435
Home Financial Corporations -- -- -- 78 50 -- 128
Nat'l Home Mortgage Finance Corp. -- 100 50 25 20 -- 195
-- 50 -- -- 250PhiIguarantee 200 --
-- 120- 950 -- 1,100KKK (LiveJihood Program) -- --
Others --. 18 15 8 10 -- 61
Government Corporations 1_972 2_952 4,122 8,677 7,121 5,573 28,417
Energy Sector 1,474 2,004 2,408 2,443 2,971 1,497 12,797
National Power Corporation 1,192 1,628 1,983 1,834 2,504 1.060 10,204
National Electrification Admn. 230 220 273 302 199 137 1,361
Philippine National Oil Co. 49 156 152 200 142 300 999
National Coal Authority -- -- -- 107 126 -- 233
industriaISector 65 158 679 1,951 999 456 4,308
NationaIDevelopment Co, 38 94 • 618 1,873 893 406 3,922
Export Processing Zone Authority 27 64 61 78 106 50 386
Housing Sector 85 228 209 763 882 477 2,644
Human Settlements Dev't Corp. -- 12 2 342 513 268 1,140
National Housing Authority 80 205 154 363 555 168 1,328
Southern Philippines Dev't Authority 5 8 50 58 14 41 176
Water Supply 128 154 249 419 393 398 1,741
MWSS 61 79 122 265 301 346 1,174
Local Water Utilities Administration 67 75 115 135 80 25 497
Rural Waterworks Dev't Corp. -- -- 12 19 12 27 70
Agricultural Sector 115 188 359 859 1,369 1,082 3,972
National Irrigation Administration 38 64 249 706 1,115 891 3,083
Philippine Cotton Corp. 19 5 16 6 10 4 29
Philippine Virginia Tobacco Admn. 37 50 44 7 .34 26 198
Philippine Fisl_eries Dev't Authority 6 -- -- 28 23 34 91
Farm Systems Development Corp. 10 32 36 47 49 30 204
National Food Authority -- -- -- 44 41 48 133
Philippine Crop Insurance Corp. -- -- -- 8 75 25 108
Other Agriculture 6 17 14 14 22 24 96
Transportation Sector 70 191 195 183 376 583 1,598
Philippine National Railway 28 136. 130 106 102 79 611
Metro Manila Transit Co. -- 35 65 15 -- 7 lt52
Light Rail Transit Authority -- -- -- 62 274 210 246
• Philippine Ports Authority ...... 142 142
Other Transportation 12 20 -- -- ,-- 145 177
Others 35 29 23 59 /131 1,080 1,357
Total " 2,433 3_398 4,522 8,081 9,368 5,778 33,580
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ing pattern of budget deficits before the 1983 crisis. One could carry
out a hypothetical exercise on what the budget deficit would be llke
ff these contributions had not been made {Table 18). Before 1981,
there would actually have been budget surpluses in the years 1978,
1979, and 1980 ffthe contributions have not been made. From 1981
on, when the economic dimension of the authoritarian experiment
started to unravel, the corporate contributions still had significant
effects on the deficit. In 1984, there would have been a budget
surplus ff not for the corporate contributions.
Evolution of Public Corporate Activity
As far as government corporate activity is concerned, 1981 was
a watershed year. Before 1981, government corporate activity was
consciously encouraged, as can be seen from an examination of the
incorporation dates of the larger corporations. In the 1974-1977
development plan, the responsibility for control and growth of these
government corporations was located in the ministries that man-
aged them. This set the pattern in which there was no overall view
of public corporate activity.
Table 18
Effect on Budget Deficit of the Contributions
to Government Corporations
Hypothetical
Total Budget Surplus (Deficit)
Contribution Without Contribution
Budget to Government
Deficit Corporations Level As % of GNP
Year (P million) (P million) (Pmillion) (Percent)
1975 1,403 807 (596) (0.5)
1976 2,349 2,196 (153) (0.1)
1977 2,852 2,498 (354) (0.2)
1978 2,167 2,877 710 0.4
1979 342 3,869 3,527 1.6
1980 3,387 5,244 1,857 0.7
1981 12,146 8,426 (3,720) (1.4)
1982 14,405 9,308 (5,097) (1.7)
1983 6,422 5,407 (1,015) (0,3)
1984 8,714 10,248 1,534 0.4
Total 54,187 50,880 3,307 (0.t )
Source:Amatong,et. al. (1985),Tables4.4 and4.5
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The 1978-1982 plan was an improvement in that it articulated
some priorities for public corporations--energy, transportation, and
even international trading. In this period, the nuclear power plant
was being built, intensive improvements in the transportation
system of Metro Manila were being planned, and there was an idea
that the government should encourage Japanese-style trading
companies to support the export drive. However, no mechanism was
set up to ensure that the priorities would be followed.
The corporate bodies under government control perfoimed
many functions of convenience. First and foremost, they were the
most convenient vehicle for responding to the availability of foreign
financing. They could contract debt on their own account, either
from govemment financial institutions (which were relending funds
borrowed from abroad) or directly from foreign institutions. Govem-
ment equity contributions provided about 48 percent of total fixed
capital investment carried out by these companies between 1975
and 1983 (Table 19). Corporations in capital-intensive industries
such as power, transportation, and water were especially efficient in
this regard.
The second convenience, related to the first, provided by govern-
ment corporate bodies was greater flexibility in mobilizing funds to
finance industrial operations. The National Development Corpora-
tion (NDC), operated by the Ministry of Trade and Industry, has in
tum many subsidiary companies (see Appendix 1) which could be
given loan from government funds. They could borrow with govern-
ment guarantee. From the list of NDC subsidiaries, one can see the
extent of government participation in the industrial sector. This will
be further discussed below.
Flexibility in lending out finances was especially important to
enable private enterprises to fland expanded operations. In the
interest of tourism development, the DBP financed the construction
of five first-class hotels in Manila. The PNB provided financing to the
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines
[CDCP) so that it could carry out a reclamation project in Manila Bay
for office and residential purposes.
The third convenience of the public corporate approach was its
greater flexibility in operation by providing insulation from cumber-
some government regulations. Using a corporate body instead of a
government agency made it possible to exempt the operation of
government corporations from following civil service rules and wage
levels in the hiring of personnel, allowing for the hiring of higher
caliber personnel, which would not have been possible under civil
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Table 19
Dependence of Government Corporations on Equity
for Capital Investment, 1975-1983
(In million pesos)
Equity
Contributions Ratio of Capital
of the Contributions to
National Fixed Capital Fixed Capital
Government Investment Investment (%)
Economic Services 40,947 89,629 45.7
Agriculture 10,484 11,096 94.5
Financial 6,889 5,344 128.9
Industry 5,844 2,206 264.9
International Relations 111 679 16.3
Trade 614 325 188.9
Power 12,587 56,507 22.3
Transportation 2,409 8,495 28.4
Water 2,009 4,845 41.5
Real Estate -- 132 --
Social Services 3,438 2,857 120.3
Education and Culture 60 1,007 6.0
Health 142 157 90.4
Housing 3,236 1,289 251.0
Social Welfare -- 404 ....
Gen. Public Services 100 146 68.5
General Research 100 123 81.3
General Services -- 23 --
Total 44,485 92,632 48.0
Source:Amatong,et. al (1985)
service rules. It also allowed these companies, at least hypotheti-
cally, greater flexibility in firing personnel.
The more important aspects of the flexibility had to do with
actual operations. The corporation's capital budget could be deter-
mined internally, without the need for review elsewhere, as long as
a combination of government contribution and outside financing
could be packaged to support it. The corporation's day-to-day
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disbursal of funds was not subject to a very close scrutiny from the
government auditing service. On the extreme, many corporations
have been exempted from even a periodic audit. In the case of the
Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC), the papers have reported
that the exemption came from a handwritten instruction by the
President himself. There were corporations which did not report
financial statements, and were not audited.
The ultimate flexibility of some of these corporate bodies was
that, as corporations, they could establish their own corporations
engaged in assorted enterprises. The clearest example was the
Human Settlements Development Corporation (HSDC) under the
Ministry of Human Settlements (Appendix 2). Some of these sub-
sldlary companies were Involved in the production of bricks, proc-
essing of vegetables, and genetic engineering.
But events in 1981 permanently changed the nature of the
public corporate sector. On 9 January 1981, a local businessman,
Dewey Dee, fled the country leaving behind him P635 million in debt
borrowed in the name of his textile company. 52 This led to the
collapse of a large commercial bank and two largest investment
houses, and to the government's rescue of four commercial banks.
Because the public sector approach was directed especially at
financial resource mobilization, this financial crisis had a profound
effect on the public corporate sector,
1981 also saw the near default of Mexico and the end of the era
of easy international credit. From this point on, the pubiic corporate
sector, which had been charged with providing the means to absorb
foreign credit, was being forced by circumstances to pay it back.
The government's response was to rely even more heavily on its
own resources and on short-term international borrowings to
maintain these corporations (see Table 12, particularly 1981). The
whole rescue effort made it necessary for the govermnent to forego
calling in its exposures to public corporations. In many cases,
amounts that were due to government financial institutions were
converted Into equity. (See Appendix 3 for a list of corporations that
had been rescued by July 1983.)
The NDC became the company by which the government exer-
cised ownership over rescued companies (see Appendix 4). At
present, the operations of these acquired companies, and the
servicing of the debt of both acquired and non-acquired companies,
are the most critical public finance issues. In the 1984 and 1985
budgets, P 10 billion pesos have been allocated in each year for "net
52. IBON Databank (1983), pp. 90-91.
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lending," which was directed toward servicing the debt of public
corporations. Another PI0 billion was allocated for "equity" contri-
butions.
Overall Evaluation
Can the evolution of the public corporate sector be understood
in terms of the political economy of the fiscal process, in the context
of the particularities of the Philippine situation? In this section, we
will further develop the interpretation we had suggested in Chapter
5 in connection with the tax reform.
The issue that the authoritarian government had to confront in
the 1970s was this: Given a country suffering from a chronic trade
deficit, how does one continue to develop and operate the country's
industrial capacity with the quadrupling of the off price in 1974?
One response would have been to let the relative world price of off
be reflected in the vector of domestic prices. This would have forced
a structural adjustment at that time. The other response, the one
that the government took, was to find the financing to pay for the
increased cost of oil. This response turned out to be seK-sustaining
until 1981, as international commercial banks s({ught to relend the
off money. This response conditioned all subsequent policies and,
to this day, continues to bedevil current efforts toward economic
recovery.
The financing response after 1974 (the public corporation
burden only began to grow in 1975) avoided assigning the burden
of adjustment to the general public at a time when the new
government was consolidating its power over the old oligarchy. The
ease with which borrowing could be undertaken then increased the
government's confidence in the new strategy. There was a quick
learning experience which, ff private interviews are to be believed,
occurred in 1976, right after the IMF-World Bank conference in
Manila.
The problem was how to direct the foreign fund kfflow to
consolidate the authoritarian experiment. The public corporate
sector, erected after 1975, provided a convertient means not only to
increase the fund inflow but also to control it. Thus, the country's
indebtedness was directed toward favored corporations, resulting
in the rapid rise of their operations. AppendL, c 4 lists one corporate
grouping that grew rapidly from two employees in 1970 to a
conglomerate in 1981. By 1983, this group, owned by a person close
to the President, had all but closed down. Its rise and fall thus
mirrored the developments in the public corporate sector.
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An important element of the public corporate strategy was to
stabilize the economic power of the group that held political power
by helping it attain a position of equality with, ffnot dominance over,
the old business conglomerates. It was not surprising, as indicated
by the list in Appendix 4, that in many cases the existing companies
were purchased by members of the Marcos group. Since they had
neither the resources nor the collateral for these purchases, many
of their loans were financed by the collateral of the properties being
purchased, and were expected to be paid from the earnings of such
propelales. In terms of economic activity, however, such asset
transfers could not be expected to result in new investment and to
an increase in productive capacity.
To some extent, these private groups did undertake new invest-
ment. In the case of the abovementioned conglomerate, there was an
investment in a cellophane manufacturing venture. Since the new
investments tended to _be in a product or a process not yet domes-
tically produced or developed, these investments almost without
exception enjoyed tax incentives and, more important to our imme-
diate interest, access to government financing, As in the pre-martial
law period, these investments tended to be capital-intensive and
heavily oriented toward serving the domestic market, which was
protected from foreign competition,
The downturn which began in 1981 and which accelerated in
1983, when foreign financing ground to a halt, posed a new problem
to the government. The owners of the new conglomerate did not
have sufficient economic stability to sustain their debt service as
their operations failed. Moreover, many of the loans had ultimately
been borrowed from abroad, ibr which the government had provided
guarantee. The taking over of these assets by the government, and
the further increase in the government corporate sector became the
only feasible response.
7
CONCLUSION
I t would be fair to say, on the basis of the record, that
the attempt to operate the country's fiscal system along corporate
lines in the 1970s did not result in a restructuring of the system in
a way that it could be more supportive of the requirements of
development.
The immediate cause of the failure was the disappearance of
foreign financing in the 1980s. As we have shown in Chapter 5, the
authoritarian government was unable to raise the tax effort and had
to rely on foreign financing both to consolidate its position and to
maintain economic growth.
We have proposed the idea that the survival imperatives of the
martial law government constricted its ability to raise the tax effort.
The same govenm]ent was constrained to implement a rapid growth
in the public corporate sector to increase the country's absorptive
capacity when foreign credit became available on demand. The
same government, however, failed to address the incentive problem
that was already embodied in the system before martial law--the
protectionist, capital-encouraging tax incentive system. More than
failing to address this problem, the authoritarian government found
that it had to expand this system of Incentives. s3 This encouraged
financial exposure in projects that dld not survive the international
credit crunch in the 1980s.
The recent Philippine fiscal experience raises many questions
about the organization of fiscal policy in developing countries.
53. Not in the averages, since, for e_ample, it undertook a serious tariff
liberalization program, but on a case-to-case basis, which can even be more
damaging.
64 FINANCING DEVELOPMENT
Because of the feudal basis of political power, the operation of a
democratic decision-making system leads to fiscal paralysis. This is
not worrisome ff private initiatives undertake the necessary invest-
ment effort. But precisely because economic power is based on
feudal privileges, the private investment rate is low irl domestic
enterprises. The state, to the extent that it is committed to "private
enterprise," is called upon to guarantee the private return.
Tlae authoritarian experiment was an attempt to break out of
this cycle. Its reliance on foreign savings, as a temporary substitute
for domestic resource mobilization, attests to the fragility of the
experiment. It could not rely heavily on domestic resources since
this would have called for a dismantling of the system of protection-
ist and rental privileges in society. While the authoritarian govern-
ment had enough power to redirect existing economic resources in
favor of its objectives, it was not powerful enough to carry out the
reforms necessary to create the new economic resources.
The decision process in the post-martial law period seems now
to have transcended the limitations of the "democratic" system only
superficially. The new process did permit more timely and more
forthright decisions. However, the "corporate" approach continued
to labor under the feudal social basis of political power, so that its
use did not improve the consultation process or the quality of social
decisions,
Our analysis suggests that the dramatic overthrow of the
Marcos corporatist experiment in February 1986 will not, by itself,
"de-paralyze" the Philippine fiscal system. The fiscal record since
1986 bears this out.
An initial attempt to raise real estate taxes in 1986 by updating
property assessment value to 1983 levels met fierce resistance and
the new Aquino government had to discontinue cabinet discussion
of the proposal. The rapid recovery period of 1987-1989 was
characterized by a boom in real estate prices. Reform in this area
continue to lag behind the economic recovery.
The rapid economic recovery has created a rapidly growing fiscal
deficit. An important explanation of this deficit, has been the
increase in interest payments on domestic debts. The Aquino
government has found it expedient to float treasury bills at interest
rates that make the financial asset holders indifferent between
holding pesos and foreign currency. These borrowings had helped
finance the foreign debt service, which had accounted for at least 40
percent of the government's, budget since 1987. The outstanding
domestic debt, estimated at P300 billion, now ihreatens the viability
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of the domestic financial system itself, and the fiscal sector is in a
new junction of paralysis.
As might have been expected in a restoration of the pre-martial
law Congress, the legislature has been unwilling and unable to take
responsibility for the rapidly increasing expenditure (including the
debt service) and for the stagnant trend in tax revenue.
In early 1991, with the approval of an IMF standby facility, the
impasse was temporarily broken with the imposition by the Execu-
tive Department of a 9 percent levy on imports. Both the executive
and the legislative agree that the solution, even with IMF acquies-
cence, is temporary by nature. But the choice of strategy once again
provides rich insights into the political economy of fiscal policy in
the Philippines and the limits of economic ideas.
The import levy, while protecting against imports, provides no
advantage to the export sector, which must now bear the tax on its
inputs. A devaluation would have been a more technically appropri-
ate response, but less acceptable politically to the industrial class.
The import levy, just like the 5 percent levy the Marcos regime
imposed in December 1983, is also a choice in favor of reducing the
rate of economic growth; as an extreme measure, its effect exceeds
that of all the natural disasters that have befallen the country since
1990. A lower rate of economic growth induces the disappearance
of the financing gap and liberates the resources needed for servicing
the foreign debt.
The strategy also provides for the emergency reduction of fiscal
policy deficit to levels consistent with a standard IMF stand by
facility.
In some Important sense, therefore, the import levy response
"solves the problem," but solves it in the "wrong" and contradictory
manner. The lower economic growth rate will make fiscal revenues
more difficult to raise, and will ultimately threaten the sustainabil-
ity of the target budget deficit. It taxes exports and, in the long run,
renders unfeasible the currenl/account deficit proJ ectlons. Because
the strategy requires that Congress provide for the substitute tax
revenue, it creates a football field when responsibillW over fiscal
policy can be passed around between legislative and executive
branches.
Thus, we have come full circle. The corporatist structure has
been replaced by the old form of democratic process. Things seem to
be very different, but then they seem to be very much the same. The
fiscal strategies have shown incredible stability throughout the
upheavals of the 1980s.
................. [, ..........................
APPENDICES
Appendix 1
National DevelopmentCorporation's list of holdings as of 1982
Company Activity % Interest
ASEAN Aceh Fertilizer fertilizer production --
ASEAN Bintulu FertilizerCorp. fertilizer production 13
ASEAN Soda Ash Co., Ltd. soda ash production --
Acoje Mining Co., Inc. mining 8.2
Agusan Plantation, Inc. palm oil plantation --
Air Mindanao Corp. air chartering --
Aluminum Smelter aluminum smelting --
Asia Industries, Inc. heavymachinery mktg 100
Bataan Pulp & Paper Mills, Inc. pulp and paper mfg --
Batangas Land Co. realestate management 60
Benguet Management Corp. management firm --
Cellophil Resources Corp. paper and pulp mfg 11
Commonwealth Dev't CorB plantation project --
Consolidated Transport, Inc. air cargo forwarding,
warehousing --
Construction & Dev't Corp.
of the Phils. construction 19
Dasmarinas Estates Dev't Corp. real estate management -
Domestic Satellite Phils., Inc. communications --
Elizalde Steel Consolidated, Inc. steel manufacturing --
Energy Corp., The oil exploration, mining 80
Equitable Venture Capital Corp. venture capital investing --
Filipinas Carbon & Mining Corp. mining 40
Filipinas Synthetic Fiber Corp. synthetic fiber mfg 25
Filipino Contractors Int'l Corp. overseas marketing,
construction --
Gomez Cellulose, Inc. cellulose production --
Goodyear Realty Corp. real estate management 60
Heavy Engineering Ind., Inc.....
Herditex Textile Mills textile 100
Hinobaan Mining Co., Inc mining --
Hyacinth Research & Dev't Corp. hyacinth development --
Hydro Resources Corp. construction --
Int'l Corporate Bank, Inc., The banking 22
Iron & Steel Corp. of the Phils. iron & steel production --
Kamayan Realty Corp. management and lease
of realestate 60
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Appendix 1 (continued)
Company Activity % Interest
Luzon Activated Carbon, Inc. activated carbon from
coconut shells --
Luzon Integrated Services, Inc. security services for
government offices --
Luzon Stevedoring Corp. inter-island shipping 100
Manila Gas Co. marketing of LPG 60
Marina Properties Corp. real estate 90
Mindanao TextileCorp. garment and textile mfg 65
Multi-Natural Resource and
Drilling Corp. mineral exploration 50
NDC-Dunlop Plantation, Inc. plantation 55
NDC Estates, Inc. real estate management --
NDC-Guthrie Plantation, Inc. palm oil p!antation 60
NDC Holdings, Inc. management company 100
NDC-Nacida Raw Materials Corp. raw materials marketing 100
NDC-Shell Minerals Investment Co. mining investments 60
NDC-Shell (Billiton) Minerals, Inc. mining 60
Nadeco Realty Corp. real estate management 60
National Galleon Shipping Corp. shipping 100
National Industrial Tree Corp. tree plantation 100
National Precision Cutting Tools,
lnc. tool manufacturing 99.98
National Rattan Corp. rattan production --
National Rayon Corp. rayon fiber mfg --
National Steel Corp. steel mill 100
Negros Occidental Copperfield
Mines, Inc. copper mining 60
New Agrix, Inc. food manufacturing 100
Paper Industries Corp. of the Phil. paper manufacturing 26.5
Paragon Paper Mills, Inc. paper manufacturing 100
People's Pulp and Paper Mills, Inc. pulp and paper mfg --
Philippine Airlines, Inc. air transportation 33
Phi.lippine Associated Smelter
and Refining Corp. copper smelter 34.42
Philippine Cellophane Film Corp. cellophane film mfg 16.66
Philippine Communications
Satellite communications --
Philippine Dockyard Corp. ship maintenance and
shipbuilding 48
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Appendix 1 (continued)
Company Activity % Interest
Philippine National Lines merchant vessels
management and
ship brokerage 20.41
Philippine Petrochemical
Products, Inc. polystyrene resin
production --
Philippine Phosphate Fertilizers
Corp. fertilizer manufacturing 60
Philippine Plate Mills Co, inc. steel mill 100
Pinagkaisa Realty Co. real estate management 60
Refractories Corp. of the Phil. basic refractors
manufacturing 58.3
Resort Hotels Corp. hostelry 41,28
San Jose Oil Co. oil exploration 20
Seafront Petroleum Corp. oil exploration 4,5
Semirara Coal Corp. mining 43.6
Summa Insurance Corp. non-life insurance 100
Transport Contractors, Inc. trucking --
Usiphil, Inc. heavy machinery mktg 69.1
Vanimo Timber Resources Corp. logging --
Venture Capital Corp. chemical manufacturing 20
Vulcan Chemical Corp. chemical manufacturing --
Vulcan Industrial & Mining Corp. mining 51
Western Minolco Corp. mining 100
Source: IBON Databank, Facts and Figures, September 1983, Table 14, p. 10
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Appendix 2
Subsidiaries of the Human Settlements Development Corporation
Name of Subsidiarias Name and Position of Total Paid-in Governmant % ot G.E.
Managing Head Capital Equity (G.E.) to Total Paid-In
Agro-Livestock Commercial EduardoA. Morato,Jr. P 6,25o,000 6,250,000 100
Development Corp. President
Alfombras Manuales Filipinas Inc. Jose Eduardo Alarilla, Jr. 4,600,000 3,98B,000 99.95
President
Bliss DevelopmentCorp. RobertoP. Alvarez 200,0O0,0O0 191,369,400 95.68
President
Bliss Marketing Corp. Eduardo V. Laureola, Jr. 33,652,537 33,652,537 1OO
General Manage_
Builder's Brick, Inc. Virgilio L. Chico, Jr. 2,000,000 i ,999,500 99.98
ExecutiveVice-President
RICA Coffee Estates Corp. Jose EduardoAlarilla, Jr. 2,430,000 2,430,000 100
Acting General Manager
Kaunlaran.Fc_)dCorp., Inc. EduardoA. Morato,Jr. 700,000 700,000] 100
President
NationalAgribusinessCorp. Jose Eduardo A[arilla,Jr. 15,000,000 15,oo0,000 100
Officer-in-Charge
People's Technology Corp. Rolando Atienza 2,000,000 2,000,0co 100Chairman/President
PhilippineFruits and PeteA.,Castillo 2,000,000 2,000,0o0 1oo
Vegetable IndustriesCorp. President
Philippine Genetics, Inc. Reynaldo Bantug 13,000,000 13,000.0o0 100
Exec. Vice Pres.& OIC
Recto Central Park Dev't Corp. Jose Conrado Benitez 25,000,300 25,oo0,300 101o
PrBsident
San Carlos Fruit Corp. Pedro A. Castillo 5,340,00]0 5,140,000 96_25
Pres. & General Manager
Woodwasm Utilizationand Amborsio A. Lina, Jr. 1,330,300 "_,330],300 100]
Development Corp. President
ZNAC Rubber Estates Corp. Jose Edua[do Aiafilla, Jr. 2,500,000 2,500,000 100
Acting General Manager
Source: Commission on Audit (1985).
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Appendix 3
Rescued Corporations
Name of Company Government Exposure" % of State State Firm
(Private Partner) (In million pesos) Equity*
Herdiscompanies: 4,600 -- NDC
1. Asia industries NDC
2. Energy Corporation NDC
3. International Corporate Bank NDC
4. Refractories Corporate Bank NDC
5. Semirara Coal Corp. NDC
6. Summa Insurance NDC
7. Usiphil, Inc. NDC
8. Vulcan ind'l and Mining Corp. NDC
9. Cellophil Resources Corp. NDC
10. Philippine Cellophane FilmCorp. NDC
11.Acoje Mining Co.
12. Multi-Natural Resources DrillingCorp. DBP/PNB/Union Bank
13. San,Jose Oil Co.
14.Seafront Petroleum and Mineral, Inc.
15. Herditex Mills, inc
16. Commercial Bank of Manila 490 99 GSIS
17. Hotel Development Corp. 2_500 -- DBP
18. Hotel Mirador and Tradewinds Hotel -- -- DBP
19. Manila Hotel 253 100 GSIS
20. Manila Mandarin Hotel 56 -- DBP
(Soriano, Recio, Uytengsu, Puyat)
21. Maranaw Hotels & ResortCcrp. 63 30 DBP
22. Century Park Sheraton 180 -- DBP
23. Phil, Hoteliers, Inc. (Ayala, Gokongwei) 126 -- DBP
24. Silahis InternationalHotel (Enriquez) 101 -- DBP
25. Philippine Village Hotel 65 -- GSIS
26. Ambassador Hotel 27.7 "-- GSIS
27. Puerto Azul Beach 9.2 -- GSIS
28. Manila Hilton 5.5 -- GSIS
29. Mayon Imperial Hotel 5.0 -- GSIS,
30. Nalinac Beach Resort 1.8 -- GSIS
31. Carlston Hotel 0.3 -- GSIS
32. Baguio Country Club 1.3 -- GSIS
33. Premier Vima Hotel 0.3 -- GSIS
34. Delta Motors Corp. (Silverio) 1,000 70 PNB
35. Marinduque Mining & ind'l Corp 10,000 46 DBP/GSIS/PNB
(Cabarrus)
36. Batangas Sugar Central (Dolor) -- 60 PNB
3"7.Paragon Paper Mills 400 -- DBP
38. Phil. Blooming Mills 1,100 -- PNB/DBP
(Cheng Ban Yek)
39. Negros Occ. Copperfield Mines, Inc. 30 70 NDC
40. AlfaTextile Mills (formerly Ramon 241 -- DBP
Sly, recently bought by Carag)
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Appendix 3 (continued)
Name of Company Government Exposure* % of State State Firm
(Private Partner) (In million pesos) Equity*
41. Continental Manufacturing Co. 109 -- DBP
(formerly Dewey Dee)
42. Lirag Textile Mills 213 -- DBP
43. Riverside Mills Corp. 213 -- DBP
44. Solid M]Ils 6 -- DBP
45. Texfiber Corp. 200 -- DBP
46. Mindanao Textile Corp, 30 -- NDC
47. Synthetic Textile Mills, Inc, -- -- DBP
.48. Pilipinas Bank (Silverio) 280 -- DBP/PNB
49. Traders Royal Bank (Benedicto) 10 -- DBP
50. Piso Bank (Barrios, Pica) 50 -- DBP
51. Producers Bank of the Phil. (Henry Co) 10 -- DBP
52. Republic Planters Bank (Benedicto) 36 -- DBP
1 PNB
53. Associated Bank (Leonardo Ty) 212 -- DBP
54. Merchant Investment Corp. (Rufino) 40 _ DBP
55. Union Bank of the Phil. (Bancom Group) 500 SSS
150 80 SSS
159 LBP
56. Construction and Development Corp. 5,000 89 DBP/PNB
of the Phil.---CDCP (Cuenca) GSIS/LBP
57. Philippine Air Lines (Toda) 982 92 GSIS
500
58. Mabuhay Vinyl Corp. 120 -- --
(Guevara, Ayala, Araneta)
59. Paper Industries Corp. of the Phil. (PICOP) 388 _ DBP
60. Sarmiento Industries, Inc. 50 -- --
*Governmentexposure includesgovernmentloansto andcapitalinvestmentorequityinthe rescued
companies.
Source: IBONDatabank(1983).
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Appendix 4
Herdis Group of Companiesa
Company/Equitylnvestment Principal Activity Current Status
(% share) b
Acoje Mining Co., ]nc. chrome mining taken over by NOC
Anselmo Trinidad & Co./75 stock brokerage taken over by [nterbank
Asia Industries, Inc,ll O0 heavy equipment distributor taken over by NDC
Asia Pacific Finance Corp. financing taken over by Interbank
Asia Pacific Real Estate real estate management non-operational
Asia Petrochemical Dev't CorpJ60 petrochemicalmanufacturing no longer under Herdis
Atrium Capital CarpJ75 investment banking taken over by [nterbank
Beta Electric Corp./6O electrical systems distributor taken over by NDC
Cellophil Resources CarpJ60 cellophane manufacturing (as of 1978) taken over by NDC
Cellulose Processing Carp,/1O0 cellophane manufacturing taken over by NDC
Commercial Bank of Manila/28 commercial banking acquired by GSIS
EnergyCorp. oil exploration taken over by NDC
EquipmentCredk Corp./1O0 equipment financing no longer under Herdis
Far East Merchants & 'TradingCarp,/1O0 trading retained by Herdis
FarewindsWarehousing Carp, warehousing retained by Herdis
Farmacor, Inc. agricultural equipmentand machineries taken over by NDC
FerrochromePhils., Inc./49 ferrachrome manufacturing acquired byVoest Alpine AG
Financial Cen_erof Asia/55 n,a. non-operational
First Summa Savings & Mortgage Bank/70 savings bank acquired by Manapat-Lagman
Group
Food Industries, Inc./90 cleanser, paper cup, vending machine
distributor no longer under Herdis
HJD Carp, distributor, Mernorexcomputer peripherals non-operational
HMC Marketing Corp,/96.40 marketing of cigaret fitters retained by Herdis
Herdi[ex Mills/67 polyester and nylon mfg (as of 1978) taken over by NDC
International Corporate Bank, IncJ30 commercial banking taken over by DBP and NDC
Koppei, IncJt oo refrigeration and air conditioner distributor taken over by NDC
Limay hd'l Dev't Corp./1O0 n.a. non-operational
Perkins Engines Phils,Co. distributor of Perkinsdiesel engines taken over by Asia Industries
Perma Marketing Corp. distributor,welding electrodes/equipment non-operational
Petrolog, IncJt O0 n.a. non-operational
Phil. Cellophane Films CorpJ53 cellophane packaging taken over by NDC
Phii. Tobacco FiltersCarpJ66 tobacco fiker manufacturing retained by Herdis
Phil. Transparent FilmCarpEl O0 n,a, non-operationaI
Power Contractors, Inc./1O0 const:uction and egineering works retained by Herdis
Refractories Corp. of the Phils./51 refractory bricksmanufacturing taken over by NDC
Relcom Development Corp./51 real estatemanagement non-operational
San Jose Oil Co./65 oil expIoration taken over by NDC
Semirara Coal CarpJ44 coalmining taken over by NDC
Sterling Inrl BrokerageCorp. customsbrokerage retained by Herdis
Summa Computer Services Corp./50 computer systerns no longer under Herdis
Summa Insurance Corp./1oo non-life insurance taken ever by NDC
Summa-Jardine Davies Phils., Inc. distributor of Memorexcomputer products non-operational
Summa Kumagal, IncJ60 construction retained by Herdis
Summa PublicMgt Services Carpi60 n.a. non-operational
Tambuli Telecommunications, IncJ80 electronic automatic exchange distributor no longer under Herdis
Technosphere Mfg. and Recyclers, IncJ62 tobacco recycling retained by Herdis
Technasphere Consultants Group, Inc,/1O0 construction management services no longer under Herdis
USI Pacific Apparel CarpJ1O0 garmentsmanufacturing no longer under Herdis
Vulcan Industrial and Mining Corp. coal and mercury mining taken over by NDC
Usiphil, IncJ1O0 heavy equipment distributor taken over by NDC
Westinghouse Asia Controls Corp. manufacturer and distributor no Ionger under Herdis
"Founded by Hern_inio T. Disini. A low years back, it was known as "the fastest-growing non-tit based
conglomerate in the country." It started out with only two employees in 1970, operating the Philippine
Tobacco Filters Corp,
has of 1980.
Source: IBON Databank, Facts and Figures (September 1983), p. 8.
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